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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters employing quantitative open economy
models to study international trade transmission, the economic impacts of cli-
mate change, and remittance transfers.
The first chapter examines the role of production sharing and trade in the
transmission of the 2008-2009 recession. In the model, production sharing is
represented by a tradable sector that produces a composite good exclusively for
the foreign market. The results suggest that trade transmission can account
for 72% of the fall in output in Canada, 19% of the fall in output in Mexico,
and about two-thirds of the fall in trade for both countries. The counterfactual
experiments find that production sharing can account for about 40% of the fall
in international trade, and 12% of the fall in output.
The second chapter quantifies the net economic impact of climate change
and climate change policy on the Canadian economy. We combine a small open
economy model of Canada with the ANEMI model, an integrated assessment
model developed at Western University. We find that while a carbon tax that
holds the stock of global emissions below the 550 ppm level would yield positive
net benefits for the world economy, the impact of such a tax on the Canadian
economy would be negative. (Joint with Jim MacGee and Jim Davies).
iii
The third chapter examines the impact of remittance transfers on the al-
location of productive factors across sectors in Latin American and Caribbean
countries. It extends a two-sector open economy model to include an endoge-
nous migration decision. Key findings are that net recipients of remittance
payments experience a reallocation of productive factors from the tradable sec-
tor to the non-tradable sector, and that the benefit from remittance inflows is
lower for countries which have a relatively less productive non-tradable sector.
iv
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This thesis consists of three essays employing quantitative open economy mod-
els to study international trade transmission, the economic impacts of climate
change, and remittance transfers.
The first essay (Chapter 2) examines the role of production sharing and
trade in the transmission of the 2008-2009 recession within NAFTA. Produc-
tion sharing, or vertical specialization, refers to the production of goods in mul-
tiple, sequential stages where value added is provided by two or more countries.
In North America, the production sharing intensity of intra-region manufactur-
ing trade is about 50 percent, and production sharing is particularly prevalent
in the auto industry and the Mexican Maquiladoras trade (Burstein, Kurz, and
Tesar (2008)).1
1The Maquiladoras Trade in Mexico consists of mostly US owned assembly plants that im-
port intermediate goods and raw materials to produce goods that are re-exported to the US.
2Production sharing may have played a significant role in the transmission
of the U.S. economic slowdown. During the recession, real trade fell roughly
three times more than real GDP in the U.S. and Mexico, and by a factor of five
in Canada. The fall in output and trade was largely accounted for by manu-
facturing, and the decline was particularly large in sectors with high levels of
production sharing. The sudden and synchronized nature of the fall in output
and trade suggest that international linkages played an important role in the
transmission of the recession across countries.
International supply chains in manufacturing are generally very special-
ized, and there is little scope to substitute inputs at each production stage.
This makes the supply chains vulnerable to demand shocks and interruptions
caused by external events, because a fall in demand at any stage can cause
a fall in demand across the whole chain.2 Then, due to the high level of spe-
cialization at each production stage, such interruptions often lead to idling of
productive factors, as full production shifts can be laid off and the capital may
go underutilized. International supply chains therefore increase the interde-
pendence of manufacturing sectors across countries.
Motivated by these observations, I develop a quantitative small open econ-
omy model to study the role of trade and production sharing in the transmis-
sion of the recession in North America. In the model, production sharing is
represented by a tradable sector that produces a composite good exclusively for
2E.g. the recent earthquake in Japan and flooding in Thailand.
3the foreign market. The results suggest that trade transmission can account
for 72% of the fall in output in Canada, 19% of the fall in output in Mexico,
and about two-thirds of the fall in trade for both countries. The counterfactual
experiments find that production sharing can account for about 40% of the fall
in international trade, and 12% of the fall in output.
The second essay (Chapter 3) quantifies the net economic impact of climate
change and climate change policy on the Canadian economy. In particular,
we seek to quantify the economic costs and benefits from different emission
reduction targets on the Canadian economy, and how this compares with the
average economic impact in the rest of the world economy.3
To tackle these questions, we combine a small open economy model of Canada
with the ANEMI model. The ANEMI model is an integrated assessment model
developed at Western University that incorporates an energy sector as well as
fossil fuel production into a neoclassical growth model. We use the ANEMI
framework to both develop our baseline analysis of the impact of carbon taxes
on the world economy, and to generate a path of carbon emissions, climate, and
(relative) price of fossil fuels which we feed into our small open economy model
of Canada.4
The ANEMI model incorporates several key innovations that are absent
3This essay is joint work with Jim MacGee and Jim Davies.
4As a small economy, the direct impact of changes in Canadian greenhouse gas emissions on
the level of global greenhouse stocks is relatively small, since Canada accounts for less than 3
percent of global GHG emissions This leads us to take the path of global greenhouse gas stocks
as independent of Canadian emissions.
4from the influential DICE framework of Nordhaus (2008). First, the ANEMI
model includes an explicit energy sector which produces a composite energy
good used in the production of final output. This energy intermediate good is
in turn produced using a composite of two broad energy sub-composites: heat
energy (i.e. fuel energy burned for transportation or industrial purposes) and
electrical energy. Each of these energy types is produced using different tech-
nologies for each of the major energy sources. This structure provides a useful
mid-point between aggregate models (such as DICE) which abstract from de-
tailed modeling of energy and more detailed bottom up models which typically
abstract from key features of dynamics and optimal choice. The second inno-
vation on the climate side is the inclusion of a simple production structure for
fossil fuels. As a result, the path of fossil fuels evolves endogenously in the
model, so that climate policy (such as carbon taxes which seek to lower de-
mand for fossil fuels) and the negative impact of climate change on aggregate
productivity (which tends to lower energy demand) both impact the temporal
path of fossil fuel prices. In turn, the equilibrium prices of fossil fuels impact
investment in capital stocks to produce energy using different types of fossil
fuels.
To highlight how Canada differs from the global average, we compare the
results from our Canadian economy to those of the ANEMI model for a carbon
tax designed to maintain the level of CO2e below 550 ppm. We find that the
5economic benefits to Canada of this carbon tax are much smaller (in fact, neg-
ative) than they are for the rest of the world. This finding is mainly due to
large differences in the calibrated damage function in the Canadian and world
model ANEMI economies. These differences reflect significant differences in
estimated impact of small temperature increases on the Canadian and global
economies. In addition, our benchmark simulation results highlight the large
impacts that carbon taxes can have on long run shifts in fossil fuel prices by
shifting the temporal path of consumption.
The third essay (Chapter 4) examines the impact of remittance transfers
on the allocation of productive factors across sectors in Latin American and
Caribbean countries. Remittance payments to many developing economies are
large. Net remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean reached USD 53
billion in 2009, about 1.5% of the region’s gross national income.5 Indeed, for
many countries, remittance flows exceed international aid and foreign direct
investment.
Recent empirical studies have found that these remittance flows are large
enough to impact (i.e. appreciate) the real exchange rate in remittance receiv-
ing countries, suggesting the presence of a Dutch Disease effect.6 (For example
Lartey, Mandelman, and Acosta (2012), Acosta, Lartey, and Mandelman (2009),
and Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004)).
5World Bank, ”Migration and Remittances Factbook” (2011).
6The term ’Dutch disease’ was originally used to describe the difficulties faced by the man-
ufacturing sector in the Netherlands following the development of natural gas on a large scale
which triggered a major appreciation of the real exchange rate.
6The Dutch Disease effect may substantially reduce the benefit of remittance
inflows if the productivity in the non-tradable sector is low relative to the pro-
ductivity in the tradable sector. By shifting productive factors into the non-
tradable sector (services), a country may experience a significant deterioration
of its aggregate productivity, if the remittance inflows are large and the produc-
tivity in the service sector relatively low. Duarte and Restuccia (2010) suggest
that differences in labour productivity levels between rich and poor countries
are larger in services than in manufacturing, and low relative productivity in
services explains all the experiences of slowdown, stagnation, and decline in
relative aggregate productivity across countries. In this paper I analyze how
the aggregate productivity in the Latin American and Caribbean economies
are affected by remittance inflows.
To quantify the impact of remittance transfers on aggregate productivity
and welfare I develop a two-sector, small open economy model where remit-
tances are a function of migration. Linking remittance inflows to the migration
decision is important because remittances are not a random process, but trans-
fers to family members from workers who migrated in order to obtain better
economic opportunities abroad.
In the quantitative experiments I compare the benchmark calibration to a
counterfactual where there is no incentive to migrate. That is, for each country
I compare the benchmark steady state equilibrium to a recalibrated steady
state with zero migration and zero remittance inflows. The results suggest that
7Latin American and the Caribbean economies have experienced an increase in
consumption per capita by 9.1% on average as a result of remittance transfers.
My results further suggest that the benefits from remittance transfers could
be 33% higher in terms of increased GDP per capita, and 27% in terms of
increased consumption per capita, if the non-tradable sector productivity in-
creased to the tradable sector level. The benefit is reduced by the shift of pro-
ductive resources into the less productive non-tradable sector. The remittance
transfers generate a Dutch Disease effect where the non-tradable sector share
increases by 6% on average, and by 15-20% for the high remittance countries.7
7In the sample, 10 out of the 33 countries are what I consider high remittance economies.
In 2000, they received remittance transfers in excess of 5% of GDP.
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9Chapter 2
The Role of Production Sharing
and Trade in the Transmission of
the Great Recession
2.1 Introduction
During the 2008-2009 recession, real trade fell roughly three times more than
real GDP in the U.S. and Mexico, and by a factor of five in Canada. The fall
in output and trade was largely accounted for by manufacturing, and the de-
cline was particularly large in sectors with high levels of production sharing.
The sudden and synchronized nature of the fall in output and trade suggest
that international linkages played an important role in the transmission of the
recession across countries.
Motivated by these observations, I develop a quantitative small open econ-
omy model to study the role of trade in the transmission of the recession in
North America. A key feature of my model is production sharing. Production
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sharing, or vertical specialization, refers to the production of goods in multiple,
sequential stages where value added is provided by two or more countries. In
NAFTA, the production sharing intensity of intra-region manufacturing trade
is about 50 percent, and production sharing is particularly prevalent in the
auto industry and the Mexican Maquiladoras trade (Burstein, Kurz, and Tesar
(2008)).1
Production sharing may have played a significant role in the transmission
of the US economic slowdown. International supply chains in manufacturing
are generally very specialized, and there is little scope to substitute inputs at
each production stage. This makes the supply chains vulnerable to demand
shocks and interruptions caused by external events, because a fall in demand
at any stage can cause a fall in demand across the whole chain.2 Then, due
to the high level of specialization at each production stage, such interruptions
often lead to idling of productive factors, as full production shifts can be laid
off and the capital may go underutilized. International supply chains therefore
increase the interdependence of manufacturing sectors across countries.
The large fall in trade relative to output during the recession may also be
related to production sharing. At each step in a supply chain, some value
added is produced before the intermediate good is shipped to the next loca-
tion for further processing or sale at its final destination. Because trade flows
1The Maquiladoras Trade in Mexico consists of mostly US owned assembly plants that im-
port intermediate goods and raw materials to produce goods that are re-exported to the US.
2E.g. the recent earthquake in Japan and flooding in Thailand.
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are measured on a gross value basis, imported intermediate goods are double
counted when they are re-exported as part of later stage intermediate goods
or final goods. This double counting generates a larger fall in trade relative to
output for production sharing goods than for standard traded goods, and the
effect would be exacerbated for international supply chains crossing multiple
national borders.
To quantify the contribution of trade and production sharing in the trans-
mission of the recession I develop a small open economy model that nests the
production structure of Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994). The economy pro-
duces two tradable and one non-tradable intermediate good. The first trad-
able intermediate is combined with imported intermediate goods to produce
a generic tradable composite good. The second tradable intermediate is com-
bined with imported intermediates to produce the production sharing compos-
ite. The production sharing composite good is only demanded abroad, repre-
senting goods produced by Canada and Mexico for the US market. The generic
tradable composite is combined with the non-tradable intermediate to produce
the final good which is used for consumption and investment. Lastly, I add
convex adjustment costs to capital.
The quantitative experiments focus on the role of trade in transmitting the
US slowdown to Canada and Mexico. This is modeled as shocks to foreign im-
port demand. I calibrate the demand shocks such that the model matches the
observed terms-of-trade movements exactly for Canada and Mexico. I calibrate
12
production sharing using OECD Input-Output tables and bilateral trade data.3
By assuming that the share of imported intermediates used in producing ex-
port goods is proportional to industry output, the I-O tables provide weights
to convert gross trade into value added measures. The benchmark calibra-
tion takes the stance that Canadian exports of auto parts and finished light
vehicles, and Mexican exports from the Maquiladoras industry are production
sharing exports.
The results indicate that trade was an important factor in transmitting the
recession to Canada and Mexico. In the benchmark calibration the model can
account for 72% of the fall in output in Canada, 19% of the fall in output in Mex-
ico, and about two-thirds of the fall in trade for both countries. The tradable
sector accounts for about three quarters of the fall in output. Intuitively, since
the shock hits the economy’s exports, the fall in output is larger in the tradable
sectors than in the non-tradable sector. Output falls more in the production
sharing sector because the shock can only be absorbed by reallocating produc-
tive factors. In the generic tradable sector the shock can be absorbed by either
reallocating productive inputs or changing the household’s consumption allo-
cation, and output therefore falls less relative to the production sharing sector.
Following shocks to foreign import demand, the capital adjustment costs act as
a friction to the reallocation of productive factors across sectors. The interac-
tion between the capital adjustment costs and the share of production sharing
3Several different measures are available to calibrate the degree of production sharing in
trade. See for example Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001), Yi (2003), or Chen, Kondratowicz, and
Yi (2005)
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in the tradable sector generate the transmission dynamics in the model.
In the counterfactual experiments I quantitatively assess the contribution
of production sharing to transmission. By comparing the model with zero pro-
duction sharing to the benchmark (holding the share of value added exports to
GDP constant) I find that production sharing can account for 40% of the fall in
trade and 12% of the fall in output. Production sharing has a bigger impact on
trade than output because of the relatively larger share of production sharing
goods in the composition of trade. This suggests that production sharing was a
contributing factor to the large fall in trade relative to output.
My work contributes to three main bodies of literature. First, it contributes
to the relatively recent literature investigating the impact of international pro-
duction sharing on comovement. Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) use indus-
try level data and find that international production linkages explain 32% of
the impact of bilateral trade on aggregate comovement. Burstein, Kurz, and
Tesar (2008) use data on US multinationals and find that manufacturing sec-
tors with higher levels of production sharing experience greater comovement in
trade flows and output. Their results also suggest that the production sharing
intensity is at least as important as trade volume in accounting for bilateral
manufacturing output correlations. In Arkolakis and Ramanarayanan (2009)
the authors study a model based on Eaton and Kortum (2002) where the degree
of production sharing varies with trade barriers. With imperfect competition
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their model generates a positive link between trade intensity and output co-
movement. In my model I highlight how production sharing in North America
is characterized by Canada and Mexico importing intermediate goods and pro-
ducing for the US market. I model production sharing as a separate tradable
sector producing a composite good that is exclusively exported. I argue that it
is important to consider the location of production plants and the direction of
trade flows when studying the impact of production sharing on comovement.
This chapter is also closely related to recent work on the post-Lehman fall
in world trade and how it contributed to the transmission of the 2008-2009 re-
cession. The empirical work in the literature generally agrees with the conclu-
sion in this chapter; for example, Eaton, Kortum, Neiman, and Romalis (2011),
Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010), and Bems, Johnson, and Yi (2010) all
argue that trade linkages were important in the propagation of the global re-
cession. Eaton, Kortum, Neiman, and Romalis (2011) use a multi-sector model
based on Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvares and Lucas (2007), and argue
that the fall in global trade and output was largely accounted for by a fall in
demand for manufacturing goods. Bems, Johnson, and Yi (2010) use a global
Input-Output framework and study how changes in final demand in the US and
Europe was transmitted to other countries. Their estimates suggest that 27%
of the fall in US demand was borne by foreign countries. Levchenko, Lewis,
and Tesar (2010) find that the fall in US trade relative to GDP was larger than
in previous recessions and argue that sectors producing intermediate inputs
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experienced larger falls in imports and exports. In addition, James (2009) ana-
lyze data from the US International Trade Commission and finds that US trade
with preferential trade partners contracted faster than trade with the rest of
the world. He suggests that the transmission of the recession in North Amer-
ica was principally through international trade. Chor and Manova (2011) argue
that credit conditions were important for transmission of the trade shock. They
find that countries with relatively tighter credit markets exported less to the
US during the recession. In this chapter I restrict my attention to North Amer-
ica, and I focus on the impact of production sharing on trade transmission. I
abstract from credit market and trade barrier frictions.
Lastly, this chapter contributes to the literature on international transmis-
sion of domestic shocks. A key challenge in this literature has been to ac-
count for comovement in international business cycle models. Schmitt-Grohe
(1998) studies open economy models and finds that interest rate and terms-
of-trade variations cannot explain US/Canadian output comovement. Baxter
and Crucini (1995) develop a two-country model and study the importance of
financial market linkages for the behaviour of business cycles. They find that
the degree of financial integration is only important if shocks are highly persis-
tent or are not transmitted internationally. Stockman and Tesar (1995) allow
for non-traded goods in a two-country model. They find that technology shocks
alone are insufficient to match the data, and include taste shocks to get predic-
tions more consistent with measurements of comovement. Kose and Yi (2006)
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use a three-country framework with transportation costs to study the impact of
trade linkages on comovement. The authors find a positive correlation between
trade and comovement, but the model still falls short of matching empirical
findings.
In this literature, my work is most closely related to Burstein, Kurz, and
Tesar (2008). The foremost difference between our work is that I examine the
2008-2009 recession, whereas the aim of Burstein et al. is to evaluate the
importance of production sharing as a mechanism to generate comovement.
Structurally, our frameworks are similar as we both extend Backus, Kehoe, and
Kydland (1994) and model production sharing as producing a composite good
only consumed by one country. The main difference between our frameworks is
that I develop a small open economy model where the production sharing good
is traded, while in their two-country model only intermediate goods are traded.
A second difference is that their model only has one intermediate good for each
country, compared to my model which has two tradable goods and one non-
tradable intermediate good. The number of sectors and which goods are traded
are important distinctions because I include capital adjustment costs which
impact the transmission dynamics in response to shocks. In the counterfactual
experiments I carefully analyze the effects of the capital adjustment costs.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 gives a brief review of
evidence on output, trade and production sharing during the recession. Section
2.3 describes the model. In section 2.4 I describe the model parameters and
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calibration strategy. The benchmark results and quantitative exercises are
described in section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Key Facts from the Recession
In this section I present three key facts on trade and the great recession in
NAFTA: (i) the timing of the decline in output and trade, (ii) the magnitude of
the fall in trade relative to output, and finally, (iii) production sharing and the
composition of the fall in output and trade.
2.2.1 Timing
Several authors, including Baldwin and Evenett (2009) and Bems, Johnson,
and Yi (2010), have pointed out the synchronised nature of the fall in output
and trade during the global recession.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the logarithm of real GDP and real trade for
Canada, Mexico, and the US from Q1 2007 to Q2 2011. In Figure 2.1, the
fall in US output leads Canada and Mexico by a quarter, indicating that the
recession started earlier in the US. Figure 2.2 shows how the fall in real trade
is more synchronized than the fall in output. Note that the fall in output in
Canada and Mexico coincides with the fall in trade across all three countries.
This suggests that trade played a role in the transmission of the recession.
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2007q1 2008q1 2009q1 2010q1 2011q1
Canada Mexico
U.S.
Notes: Vertical line approximately marks the fall of the Lehman Brothers which filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on September 15, 2008.
Source: OECD Statistics - Quarterly National Accounts.












2007q1 2008q1 2009q1 2010q1 2011q1
Canada Mexico
U.S.
Source: OECD Statistics - Quarterly National Accounts.
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Table 2.1: Real GDP and Real Trade - US, Canada, and Mexico
U.S. Canada Mexico
Real GDP -5.0% -3.7% -9.9%
Real Trade -15.7% -18.7% -26.9%
The quantitative exercises in this chapter focus on Q2 2008 to Q2 2009. This
period roughly coincides with the peak to trough of US real GDP per capita. As
shown in Figure 2.1, there is a small dip in US GDP (solid line) from Q4 2007
to Q1 2008 before it reaches a local peak at Q2 2008, and then declines until
Q2 2009.
2.2.2 Fall in Trade Relative to Output
Table 2.1 displays the change in real GDP and real trade over Q2 2008 to Q2
2009. Real GDP fell 5% in the US, 3.7% in Canada, and 9.9% in Mexico. The
declines in trade are more striking, as trade falls roughly three times more
than real GDP in the U.S. and Mexico, and by a factor of five in Canada.
For Canada and the US the fall in trade relative to output during the re-
cession was large compared to previous episodes. Figure 2.3 plots four-quarter
changes in trade relative to GDP against the change in real GDP from Q1 1960
to Q4 2010 for Canada (left panel) and the US (right panel). The smaller gray
20
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U.S.
Notes: Four-quarter changes in trade relative to GDP against the change in real GDP,
1960-2010. A similar plot appears in Eaton, Kortum, Neiman, and Romalis (2011).
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS).
dots and the regression line is based on the observations prior to the 2008-
2009 recession, and the four solid black dots represents the observations for
the recession period. For Canada, the solid black dots appear to the far left,
indicating the severity of the recession, and three of the four dots are well be-
low the regression line representing a deviation from earlier episodes. The US
shows a similar but less pronounced pattern.
2.2.3 Production Sharing, Output and Trade
Table 2.2 presents a decomposition of GDP, and shows the contribution of each
sector to the fall in GDP from Q2 2008 to Q2 2009.
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Table 2.2: Decomposition of GDP - US, Canada, and Mexico
Share of GDP % ∆ Contribution to
Average 2006 - 2010 Q2 2008 - Q2 2009 fall in GDP
U.S. Can Mex U.S. Can Mex U.S. Can Mex
Mining, oil, gas 1% 5% 5% -39% -7% -2% 13% 9% 1%
Manufacturing 13% 14% 18% -15% -14% -14% 47% 58% 30%
Other tradable 9% 19% 27% -12% -6% -14% 25% 31% 45%
Non-tradable 77% 62% 50% -1% 0% -4% 15% 3% 24%







































































.05 .1 .15 .2
Exports to U.S.
Notes: Fall in output (left) and exports to U.S. (right) for manufacturing sectors in Canada
against the ratio of imported intermediates to industry output for corresponding
manufacturing sectors in U.S., Q2/2008-Q2/2009
Source: Statistics Canada, US International Trade Commission, OECD Input-Output Tables
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The sectoral impact of the recession in Canada and the US is similar. The
tradable sector (mainly manufacturing) largely accounts for the fall in output.
The picture is less clear for Mexico, where manufacturing accounts for a third
and the non-tradable sector a quarter of the fall in output, but transportation,
retail and wholesale trade also experienced significant declines.
During the recession, Canadian manufacturing sectors with production link-
ages to the US experienced greater declines in output and exports. Figure 2.4
shows scatter plots of the fall in output (left panel) and exports to the US (right
panel) for Canadian manufacturing sectors plotted against imported interme-
diates relative to industry output in the US. The regression lines show a neg-
ative relationship, suggesting that production sharing was important in trans-
mitting the recession to Canada.
As an example, consider the impact on the Canadian automotive industry
following the closure of several North American assembly plants during 2009.
Most of the closures were temporary, although GM’s Oshawa Truck plant and
six US plants shut down for good. The effect of the assembly plant closures
was severely felt by the Canadian auto parts industry. According to Industry
Canada (2006), Canadian auto parts and component manufacturing consists
of about 900 establishments which on average export 61% of their production
value. The recession led to large scale layoffs at several major parts manufac-




To quantify the contribution of trade and production sharing in the transmis-
sion of the recession, I use a real business cycle framework that incorporates
production sharing. The model is a small open economy that nests the produc-
tion structure of Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994).4 The economy produces
two tradable intermediate goods and one non-tradable intermediate good. The
first tradable intermediate good is both exported and combined domestically
with an imported intermediate good to produce a tradable composite good. The
second tradable intermediate good is combined with an imported intermediate
good to produce the production-sharing composite good. This good is only de-
manded abroad, and all of its production is exported. The production sharing
composite represents goods produced by Canada and Mexico for the US market.
Lastly, the first composite good is combined with the non-tradable intermedi-
ate to produce the (non-traded) final good which is used for consumption and
investment. A flowchart describing the model is included in Figure 2.5.
To avoid excess volatility of investment in response to foreign demand shocks
I include capital adjustment costs. The adjustment costs limit the investment
response to shocks and change the transmission dynamics in the model. The
financial market is represented by a one-period, non-contingent bond. Unless
otherwise stated, all variables are denoted in per capita quantities.
4By setting the production sharing sector and the non-tradable sector to zero, my model
collapses to an open economy version of the Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994) framework.
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Figure 2.5: Model Flowchart
Notes: x1 is an intermediate good that is exported and used in producing the generic tradable
composite good, v1. x2 is the production sharing intermediate good, aggregated with the
imported intermediate x2,im to produce the production sharing composite good, v2, which is
exclusively exported. The final good y is produced by aggregating the non-traded good ynt and
the tradable composite good, v1. The (non-traded) final good is used for consumption and
investment.
25
2.3.1 The Representative Household
The economy is populated by a representative household that chooses con-




βt (cµt (1 − nt)1−µ)1−σ
1 − σ
)
, 0 < µ < 1, 0 < β < 1, 0 < σ (2.1)
where ct is consumption and nt is the amount of labour supplied in period t. β
is the discount factor, µ is the intratemporal share parameter for consumption
and leisure, and σ pins down the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The
household’s time endowment is normalized to 1.
The household supplies labour services and rents capital to the firms. The
law of motion for gross investment in sector j (two tradable and one non-
tradable) is:
ij,t = kj,t+1 − (1 − δ)kj,t + Φk(kj,t+1, kj,t), j = 1, 2, nt (2.2)
Φk is the capital adjustment cost function which follows Cogley and Nason
(1995). The functional form implies that the marginal cost of adjusting the








, 0 < ψk, = 1, 2, nt (2.3)
5Mendoza (1991) uses a related specification where the marginal cost is a linear function of
net investment.
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Here, ψk is a constant parameter defining the capital adjustment cost func-
tion.
The household can borrow or lend in the international financial market by
a risk-free bond. As Canada and Mexico are net debtors, I refer to the asset dt
as the household’s debt. The household’s debt evolves according to:
dt+1 = dt(1 + rd,t) − tbt (2.4)
where tbt = exportst − importst is the trade balance.
To avoid a unit root in the log-linearized system, I introduce portfolio ad-
justment costs following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003). The representative
household faces quadratic costs of holding debt quantities that deviate from




(dt+1 − d)2 , 0 < ψd (2.5)
where dt is the current debt level, d is the steady state debt level, and ψd is a
constant parameter defining the portfolio adjustment cost function.6
The household’s budget constraint is:
6The portfolio adjustment cost function is a technical detail to make the model stationary for
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where ij,t, kj,t, nj,t is investment, capital, and labour supplied to sector j in
period t respectively, dt is the current period’s debt, rd,t is the risk-free interest
rate, and Φk and Φd are the adjustment cost functions for capital and external
debt.
2.3.2 Technology
In the model, representative firms produce two tradable intermediate goods,
the non-tradable intermediate good, two tradable composite goods, and the
(non-traded) final good.
Intermediate Good Production
The two tradable intermediate goods are produced by competitive firms. Each






j , 0 < α < 1 , j = 1, 2 (2.7)
where kj is the amount of capital rented, nj is the amount of labour hired, and
xj is the amount of intermediate goods produced in sector j. α is capital’s share




qxj xj − rjkj − wjnj s.t. kj, nj > 0 (2.8)
where wj is the wage rate, rj the rental rate for capital, and qxj is the relative
price of intermediate good j in terms of the final good.
The non-tradable intermediate good is produced from capital and labour by





nt , 0 < α < 1 (2.9)
where α is capital’s share in output for the non-tradable sector. Each period




qntynt − rntknt − wntnnt (2.10)
Here, qnt is the price of the non-tradable good in terms of the final good.
Composite Good Aggregation
In each tradable sector j, a composite good is produced by a representative firm





j,h + (1 − ωj)xηjj,im
)1/ηj , 0 ≤ ωj ≤ 1, ηj ≤ 1, j = 1, 2 (2.11)
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where xj,h is the domestic intermediate and xj,im the imported intermediate
used in producing the composite good vj. Note that, for j = 2, in the production
sharing sector, x2,h = x2. ωj is the CES share parameter representing the home-
bias, and 1/(1 − ηj) is the elasticity of substitution for the domestic and imported




qvj vj − qxj xj,h − qx
∗
j xj,im (2.12)
where qvj is the price of composite good j and qx
∗
j is the price of the imported
intermediate good, both in terms of the final good.
Final Good Aggregation and Market Clearing
The final good is produced by a representative firm taking the tradable com-




γvθ1 + (1 − γ)yθnt
)1/θ , 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, θ ≤ 1, (2.13)
where γ is the CES share parameter and 1/(1 − θ) is the elasticity of substitution
for the tradable composite and the non-tradable good. Each period the perfectly




y − qv1v1 − qntynt (2.14)
The price of the final good has been normalized to 1. The resource constraint




ij,t + Φd(dt+1) ≤ yt (2.15)
In the labour and capital markets, the quantities supplied by the household
must equal the quantities demanded by the firms each period:










Market clearing for intermediate goods in sector 1 implies:
x1 = x1,h + x1,ex (2.17)
where x1 is the quantity of intermediate good 1 produced, x1,h the quantity
consumed at home, and x1,ex the quantity exported. The intermediate good
produced in sector 2 is only used to produce the composite good in sector 2, and
is not exported.
7By substituting for the value of the final good you can show that the resource constraint is
equivalent to the household’s budget constraint. See appendix for details.
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2.3.3 Foreign Import Demand
The intermediate goods from sector 1 not consumed domestically, and all of
the composite goods produced in sector 2 (the production sharing sector) are



























, 0 ≤ pi∗ ≤ 1, φ∗ ≤ 1 (2.19)
Here, from the perspective of the foreign economy, ω∗1 and pi∗ are the CES
share parameters, while 1/(1 − η∗1) and 1/(1 − φ∗) are the elasticities of substi-
tution between domestic and imported goods respectively. The prices qx∗1 and
qv
∗
2 , and the size of the sectors x∗1, v∗2 are given exogenously. z represents the
foreign demand shock, and follows an AR(1) process:
zt+1 = ρzt + t , 0 < ρ < 1 (2.20)
where ρ is the persistence parameter and t is a normally distributed random
variable with mean 0 and variance σ2 .
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2.3.4 Equilibrium and Solving the Model
An equilibrium in this model is a sequence of prices and quantities such that
the first order conditions to the firms’ and the household’s maximization prob-
lems, and the market clearing conditions are satisfied in every period. The
household maximizes (2.1) with respect to (2.6), (2.4), and (2.2).
To solve the model I use the linearization method now common in the in-
ternational business cycle literature (e.g. see Uhlig (1995)). To linearize and
simulate the model I use Dynare.8
2.4 Parameterization and Calibration Strategy
This section describes the model parameter values and the calibration strategy.
First, I describe the choice of typical international business cycle parameters
and the parameters specific to my model; second, I explain the calibration ex-
ercise used to match a set of observable moments.
I calibrate the model to Canada and Mexico. Each period corresponds to a
quarter.
8Dynare is a software package developed at Cepremap. See Adjemian, Bastani, Juillard,
Mihoubi, Perendia, Ratto, and Villemot (2011).
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Table 2.3: International Business Cycle Parameters
Parameter Value Description
α 0.32 Capital share in output
β 0.99 Discount factor
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate
µ 0.36 Share parameter for consumption and leisure
σ 2.0 Risk aversion parameter
ψd 0.00074 Portfolio adjustment cost
ρ 0.95 AR(1) persistence parameter
1/(1 − η1) 3.0 Es domestic and imported intermediate 1
1/(1 − η2) 3.0 Es domestic and imported intermediate 2
1/(1 − η∗1) 1.5 Es foreign import demand intermediate 1
1/(1 − φ∗) 1.5 Es foreign import demand composite 2
1/(1 − θ) 2.0 Es tradable and non-tradable goods
2.4.1 International Business Cycle Parameters
For parameters typically found in international business cycle models I take
common parameter values from the literature. Table 2.3 lists the benchmark
values for the parameters. Each parameter falls within the range of values
used in the literature.
The portfolio adjustment cost parameter, ψd, from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2003), is calibrated in their small open economy model to match observed
volatility in the Canadian current-account-to-GDP ratio. α, capital’s share of
output is set to 0.32,9 µ, the share parameter for consumption and leisure is
set to 0.36, and σ, the coefficient of relative risk aversion is set to 2.0. β = 0.99
implies an annual risk-free interest rate of 4%. Similarly δ = 0.025 implies an
9Gollin (2002) suggests that after accounting for labour income of the self-employed, income
shares to labour/capital are similar across countries.
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Table 2.4: Model Specific Parameters
Parameter Canada Mexico Target Moment
d 0.64 0.19 Net external debt share of GDP (d/y)
x∗1 0.25 0.23 Relative sector size of tradable sector (x1/x∗1)
v∗2 0.12 0.10 Relative sector size of manufacturing (v2/v∗2)
ψk 1.46 1.82 Relative volatility of investment and GDP (cvi/cvy)
annual depreciation rate of 10%. ρ, the AR(1) persistence parameter, is set to
0.95 because business cycle models generally need shocks to be very persistent
in order to match observed quantity movements.10 The Armington elasticity
parameters are set to target the relative volatility of exports to output in the
domestic sectors. The model matches the data better when the elasticities in
the domestic sectors are higher relative to the foreign import demand equa-
tions. In the benchmark model, 1/(1 − η1) and 1/(1 − η2) are set to 3.0, and
1/(1 − η∗1) and 1/(1 − φ∗) are set to 1.5.
Table 2.4 lists the parameters I choose to target specific moments for Canada
and Mexico. The steady state debt-level, d, targets the net external debt as a
share of GDP. x∗1 and v∗2, the parameters representing the size of the foreign
sectors for intermediate good 1 and composite good 2, are set to match the size
of the Canadian and Mexican manufacturing and tradable sectors relative to
the US. ψk, the capital adjustment cost parameter, is set to match the volatility
of investment relative to GDP.
10See for example King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988).
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2.4.2 Calibration of Production Sharing
To calibrate production sharing in the model I use the CES share parameters
from the domestic Armington aggregators and foreign import demand equa-
tions. I target the four moments listed in Table 2.5.
I use data on services, construction, and utilities to calculate the non-tradable
share of GDP. The value added share of exports is calculated by subtracting the
weighted average of imported intermediates used in production from gross ex-
ports. I assume that the content of imported intermediates used in the produc-
tion of exports is proportional to the average for each sector. The share of the
type 2 composite good in exports is the production sharing content of exports.
For the benchmark calibration I assume that auto parts and light vehicles rep-
resents Canadian production sharing exports, and that the Maquiladoras sec-
tor represents production sharing exports for Mexico. To calculate the value
added in the production sharing sector I subtract the weighted average of im-
ported intermediates used in production in the respective sectors.
To implement the calibration I add four additional restrictions to the sys-
tem of equations characterizing the steady state in the model. I solve for the
CES share parameters from the domestic composite good aggregation and the
foreign import demand equations simultaneously with the steady state. The
calibrated CES share parameters are listed in Table 2.6.
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Table 2.5: Calibration Moments
Benchmark Model Moments Canada Mexico
Non-tradable share of GDP 61% 50%
Value added export share of GDP 30% 23%
Type 2 composite share in exports 26% 52%
Value added in type 2 composite 56% 61%
Table 2.6: Calibrated CES Share Parameters
Parameter Canada Mexico Description
ω1 0.54 0.51 Home-bias, intermediate 1
ω2 0.38 0.35 Home-bias, intermediate 2
ω∗1 0.61 0.89 Foreign home-bias, intermediate 1
pi∗1 0.76 0.80 Foreign home-bias, composite 2
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2.5 Results
This section uses the model to quantitatively assess the role of trade and pro-
duction sharing in transmitting the 2008-2009 recession from the US to Canada
and Mexico. I restrict my attention to North America because of the region’s
strong production and trade linkages.
I first present the benchmark results to quantify the total impact of trade on
the transmission process. I then present counterfactual experiments to mea-
sure the contribution of production sharing to transmission, and the model’s
sensitivity to the capital adjustment costs. In the first experiment I vary the
share of the production sharing export good in total exports, holding the capital
adjustment costs constant. In the second experiment I vary the capital adjust-
ment costs while holding the share of production sharing exports constant.
In the quantitative exercises I introduce a shock to the foreign import de-
mand equations. For the benchmark, the shock is calibrated to match the ob-
served terms of trade movements for Canada and Mexico. In the counterfactual
experiments I restrict the analysis to Canada. The respective terms of trade
shocks are displayed in Figure 2.6. For the simulations, I focus on the period
from Q2 2008 to Q2 2009, and measure the impact of the shock on GDP, trade,
investment, and hours.
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2008q2 2008q3 2008q4 2009q1 2009q2 2009q3
Canada Mexico
Notes: Bilateral terms of trade with US, manufactured goods.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2.5.1 Benchmark Model Results: Canada
The benchmark results are displayed in Figures 2.7 - 2.11. For Canada, the
model predictions account for 72% of the fall in GDP, 65% of the fall in trade,
54% of the fall in investment, and 20% of the fall in hours worked.
The left panel of Figure 2.7 displays real GDP for Canada and the model’s
prediction. The only shock in the model is the import demand shock, which is
calibrated to match the observed terms-of-trade movement, and the simulated
variables in the model inherit this shape. Therefore, the predicted path for
GDP has an initial peak at Q3 2008, and then declines until the trough in Q2
2009. 74% of the decline in GDP is from the tradable sector, and the produc-
tion sharing sector accounts for almost 30% of that decline. In the data, the
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Source: Statistics Canada and INEGI-BIE.
tradable sector accounts for 97% of the fall in output (counting wholesale and
retail trade as tradable sectors), and transportation equipment manufacturing
accounts for about 20% of the decline. The fall in output in the non-tradable
sector is negligible as moderate declines in output for construction and utilities
are offset by a small increase in output for services.
The results for Canadian exports are presented with the data in Figure 2.8.
The shape is from the terms-of-trade, but the initial increase and subsequent
fall are more exaggerated than GDP. 38% of the fall in exports is accounted
for by the production sharing composite good, and the remainder is accounted
for by the generic tradable sector. Exports are more responsive to the demand
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shock because its composition includes a larger share of the production shar-
ing sector relative to GDP. The shock has a greater impact in the production
sharing sector because the domestic economy can only respond to the shock by
reallocating productive factors. For the traded intermediate in sector 1, the do-
mestic economy can reallocate productive factors and adjust its consumption
allocation between the tradable and the non-tradable composites. The magni-
tude of this effect depends on the severity of the capital adjustment costs.
Figure 2.9 shows real imports in the data and model. Imports experience
a relatively large decline because the demand for imported intermediates falls
following the foreign demand shock. The impact on imports is also affected by
the relative size of the production sharing sector as intermediates used in the
production sharing sector are more responsive to the demand shock compared
to intermediates used in the sector 1 composite.
The model can account for roughly half of the fall in investment for Canada.
Figure 2.10 shows the path for investment and the model prediction. The cap-
ital adjustment cost parameter was set such that the model matches the ob-
served volatility of investment relative to output (as measured by the ratio of
the coefficients of variation). The benchmark results explain about half of the
fall in investment during the recession.
Figure 2.11 shows hours worked for the model and data. The model falls
short in explaining the fall in hours worked, as there is no labour friction
in the model. Following a shock to the tradable sectors, there is a moderate
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fall in aggregate hours worked, and some labour is reallocated into the non-
tradable sector. Hours worked in the production sharing sector fall by 11%, in
the other tradable sector they fall by 2%, while hours increase by 0.5% in the
non-tradable sector. Aggregate hours worked fall by about 1%.
2.5.2 Benchmark Model Results: Mexico
For Mexico, the model predictions account for 19% of the fall in GDP, 69% of
the fall in trade, 35% of the fall in investment, and 13% of the fall in hours
worked.
The calibration for Mexico has a larger production sharing component in ex-
ports, but a smaller value added share of exports in GDP. Because of the larger
production sharing share in exports, Mexican exports are more responsive to
the demand shock than Canadian exports (Figure 2.8). However, because of the
lower value added share of exports in GDP, Mexican GDP is less responsive to
a demand shock than Canadian GDP (Figure 2.7).
71% of the decline in GDP is from the tradable sector, where the production
sharing sector accounts for about 68% the decline. The production sharing
sector also accounts for 83% of the decline in Mexican exports. These findings
suggest that production sharing was more important in transmitting the trade
shock to Mexico than to Canada.
In my model, these results are due to the larger share of production sharing
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exports in the benchmark calibration for Mexico. The results are consistent
with the empirical findings of Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010). According
to their results, the bilateral trade intensity is more important for the impact
of trade on comovement for North-North country pairs, while production shar-
ing is more important for North-South pairs.11 They estimate that vertical
linkages can account for 73% of the overall impact of trade on comovement for
North-South pairs, but only 17% for North-North pairs.
Overall, the model falls short in explaining the fall in output for Mexico.
However, this is actually a positive sign since the Mexican economy experi-
enced additional shocks that are not accounted for by my model. Remittance
transfers from migrant workers and tourism receipts fell about 16% over the
same period, and the H1N1 flu pandemic which broke out in March 2009 likely
exacerbated the recession in Mexico. The impact of these additional factors
likely contributed to the much larger fall in GDP experienced by Mexico rela-
tive to Canada and the United States.
2.5.3 The Role of Production Sharing in Transmission
Production sharing may have been a contributing factor to the large fall in
trade and the transmission of the US economic slowdown. Di Giovanni and
11Here North refers to OECD countries and South refers to non-OECD countries. Their
sample spans the period 1970-1999. Mexico became an OECD member in 1994 and is therefore
counted as a non-OECD country in their estimations.
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Levchenko (2010) estimate that vertical linkages can account for about 30% of
the impact of bilateral trade on aggregate comovement, and Burstein, Kurz,
and Tesar (2008) suggest that the production sharing intensity is at least as
important as trade volume in accounting for bilateral manufacturing output
correlations. In this experiment I quantify the relative contribution of produc-
tion sharing in trade transmission for Canada. I use the Canadian calibration
and vary the share of production sharing exports in total exports. I recalibrate
the model when setting the production sharing share of exports to zero, and to
39%, a 50% increase relative to the benchmark.
The results are displayed in Figure 2.12. Comparing the zero production
sharing case (labeled ’low’) to the benchmark the results suggest that produc-
tion sharing can account for 12% of the fall in GDP, and about 40% of the fall
in trade in Canada. The impact on investment and hours worked is negligible.
My benchmark results suggest that international production sharing is less
important in explaining comovement in output, but more important for trade.
This finding indicates that production sharing can be part of the explanation
for the large fall in trade relative to output during the recession. However, my
results are sensitive to the calibration of production sharing, capital adjust-
ment costs, as well as the choices of Armington elasticity parameters.
In the model, production sharing and the capital adjustment costs amplify
the effect of the demand shock because capital becomes ’stuck’ in the production
sharing sector. As explained in the previous section, in the production sharing
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sector the shock can only be absorbed by reallocating productive factors. The
capital adjustment costs restrict capital movement across sectors, and there-
fore the efficiency loss to the adjustment costs is greater when the production
sharing sector is bigger.
When the production sharing share in exports is increased from 26% to 39%
the trade channel explains 79% of the fall in GDP and 84% of the fall in trade
for Canada.
2.5.4 Capital Adjustment Costs
In my model, the link between the capital adjustment costs and the production
sharing sector plays an important role in generating the transmission dynam-
ics. As all the goods produced in the production sharing sector are exported, the
model can only absorb shocks to this sector by reallocating productive factors.
The capital adjustment costs slow the reallocation of capital, and the impact of
external shocks is exacerbated. In this experiment I quantify the impact of the
capital adjustment costs on the transmission of the demand shock in the model.
In the Canadian calibration I vary the capital adjustment costs while holding
the production sharing share of exports constant at the benchmark level. I
recalibrate the model for capital adjustment costs reduced to half, and double
that of the benchmark value. This implies volatilities for Investment relative
to GDP of 1.98 and 1.03 respectively, compared to the benchmark value of 1.46.
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The results are displayed in Figure 2.13. The results show relatively small
changes in GDP, aggregate hours worked, and imports in response to chang-
ing the capital adjustment costs. Exports on the other hand experience larger
movements as the responsiveness of production sharing exports is directly
linked to the mobility of productive factors.
With higher capital adjustment costs, capital movement is more restricted
and the changes in hours worked across sectors are larger. That is, the labour
allocation moves more across sectors in order to compensate for the less mobile
capital input. The reallocation of labour results in a larger drop in production
sharing output and exports.
With lower capital adjustment costs, capital has more freedom to reallocate
and investment in the tradable sectors falls more relative to the benchmark. In
response to the shock there is less forced reallocation of labour across sectors,
and output in the production sharing sector and exports fall less.
2.6 Conclusion
The 2008-2009 recession had a large impact on GDP and trade in North Amer-
ica. The results of this chapter suggest that trade linkages played a significant
role in the transmission of the US recession to its regional trading partners.
In the benchmark calibration the model predictions can account for 72% of the
fall in output for Canada, 19% for Mexico, and almost two-thirds of the fall in
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trade. The quantitative experiments suggest that production sharing accounts
for about 40% of the fall in trade, but only 12% of the fall in output. Together
these results indicate that production sharing may be an important factor in
explaining why trade fell so much relative to output during the great recession,
and in explaining trade comovement in general.
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Chapter 3
The Impact of Climate Change
and Climate Policy on the
Canadian Economy
3.1 Introduction
The emerging scientific consensus that the global climate is changing has sparked
substantial debate over both the impact and effectiveness of policy targeted
at mitigating greenhouse gas emissions (see e.g. Stern (2006) and Nordhaus
(2008)). In this paper, we seek to quantify the net economic impact of climate
change and climate change policy on the Canadian economy. In particular, we
seek to quantify the economic costs and benefits from different emission reduc-
tion targets on the Canadian economy, and how this compares with the average
economic impact in the rest of the world economy.
To tackle these questions, we combine a small open economy model of Canada
with the ANEMI model. The ANEMI model is an integrated assessment model
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developed at Western University that incorporates an energy sector as well as
fossil fuel production into a neoclassical growth model. We use the ANEMI
framework to both develop our baseline analysis of the impact of carbon taxes
on the world economy, and to generate a path of carbon emissions, climate, and
(relative) price of fossil fuels which we feed into our small open economy model
of Canada.1
The ANEMI model incorporates several key innovations that are absent
from the influential DICE framework of Nordhaus (2008). First, the ANEMI
model includes an explicit energy sector which produces a composite energy
good used in the production of final output. This energy intermediate good is
in turn produced using a composite of two broad energy sub-composites: heat
energy (i.e. fuel energy burned for transportation or industrial purposes) and
electrical energy. Each of these energy types is produced using different tech-
nologies for each of the major energy sources. This structure provides a useful
mid-point between aggregate models (such as DICE) which abstract from de-
tailed modeling of energy and more detailed bottom up models which typically
abstract from key features of dynamics and optimal choice. The second inno-
vation on the climate side is the inclusion of a simple production structure for
fossil fuels. As a result, the path of fossil fuels evolves endogenously in the
1As a small economy, the direct impact of changes in Canadian greenhouse gas emissions on
the level of global greenhouse stocks is relatively small, since Canada accounts for less than 3
percent of global GHG emissions This leads us to take the path of global greenhouse gas stocks
as independent of Canadian emissions.
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model, so that climate policy (such as carbon taxes which seek to lower de-
mand for fossil fuels) and the negative impact of climate change on aggregate
productivity (which tends to lower energy demand) both impact the temporal
path of fossil fuel prices. In turn, the equilibrium prices of fossil fuels impact
investment in capital stocks to produce energy using different types of fossil
fuels.
To highlight how Canada differs from the global average, we compare the
results from our Canadian economy to those of the ANEMI model for a carbon
tax designed to maintain the level of CO2e below 550 ppm. We find that the
economic benefits to Canada of this carbon tax are much smaller (in fact, neg-
ative) than they are for the rest of the world. This finding is mainly due to
large differences in the calibrated damage function in the Canadian and world
model ANEMI economies. These differences reflect significant differences in
estimated impact of small temperature increases on the Canadian and global
economies. In addition, our benchmark simulation results highlight the large
impacts that carbon taxes can have on long run shifts in fossil fuel prices by
shifting the temporal path of consumption.
There is a large and growing literature that seeks to quantify the economic
impact of climate change as well as the costs of lowering greenhouse gas emis-
sions (e.g. see Stern (2006) and Nordhaus (2008)). While our modeling struc-
ture builds upon the heavily cited DICE model of Nordhaus, the ANEMI model
differs in how we model the energy sector.
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Most of the literature with a Canadian focus has used static CGE models
used to examine the impacts of climate policy on Canada (see e.g. Hamilton
and Cameron (1994), Jaccard and Montgomery (1996), Ab Iorwerth, Bagnoli,
Dissou, Peluso, and Rudin (2010), Dissou (2005), Wigle and Snoddon (2007),
Boehringer and Rutherford (2010). Several papers have also used sectoral
models: Jaccard and Montgomery (1996), Jaccard, Loulou, Kanudia, Nyboer,
Bailie, and Labriet (2003), Simpson, Jaccard, and Rivers (2007). Our model
differs both in the details of how we model the interaction between energy and
economic output, and in our focus on comparing the net economic benefits of
climate policy in Canada versus the rest of the world.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes
the calibration of the Canadian damage function. Section 3.3 outlines the key
features of the model, while Section 3.4 reviews the calibration of key model
parameters and the baseline simulation. Section 3.5 discusses our carbon tax
experiment, while Section 3.6 provides a brief conclusion.
3.2 A Canadian Climate Damage Function
A key element in assessing the impact of climate change and climate policy in
Canada is the economic damages associated with changes in mean tempera-
ture. This is especially important when comparing Canada to global averages,
given our geographical location.
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In constructing a climate change damage function, we adopt the approach
of Nordhaus (2008) and model damages as a quadratic in global mean temper-
ature. To construct estimates for Canada, we draw on regional damage esti-
mates for the U.S. from Mendelsohn (2001). Mendelsohn presents estimated
damages for seven U.S. regions for five sectors (Agriculture, Forestry, Energy,
Coastal Structures, and Water Resources) at varying degrees of warming (1.5,
2.5, and 5.0 degrees Celsius) and varying levels of precipitation (0%, 7%, and
15% over 1990 levels) in 2060. We fit these estimates to our quadratic using
estimated damages at T = 2.5◦ and T = 5◦ warming and 0% increase in precip-
itation above preindustrial levels for the four northern U.S. regions.
Figure 3.1 plots the U.S. regions for which Mendelsohn reports detailed es-
timates of the potential impact of climate change.
Table 3.1 summarizes the mapping we follow between U.S. regions and
Canadian regions.
Table 3.1: Mapping U.S. Regions into Canadian Regions






The estimates in Mendelsohn (2001) are based on studies employing both
simulation models and empirical models examining cross-sectional differences
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Figure 3.1: Mendelsohn’s Regions
Source: Mendelsohn (2001, p. 8)
across climate zones. The climate benefits (damages) are estimated separately
for each sector and region, relative to a baseline scenario of the economic con-
ditions in 2060.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show estimated market damages from Mendelsohn at 0%
increase in precipitation.2 At 2.5 degrees of warming all regions are experienc-
ing net benefits in the Agriculture, Forestry, and Energy sectors, except for the
Northwest region, which have damages of 0.6 billion. Damages to coastal struc-
tures are negligible, but the water systems sector see some damages, particu-
larly in the Northwest region. Overall, the Northeast, Midwest, and Northern
Plains regions have net benefits as a result of a 2.5 degree warming, whereas
2Appendix B provides a comparison of the 7% and 15% precipitation scenarios.
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the Northwest region experience small damages.
Table 3.2: Mendelsohn’s Damage Estimates for T = 2.5◦ Warming
Agriculture Forestry Energy Coast Water Total
Northeast 2.8 2.6 0.2 -0.1 0.0 5.5
Midwest 6.3 1.0 0.3 0.0 -0.2 7.4
Northern Plains 4.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 -0.6 4.4
Northwest 2.1 -0.6 1.4 0.0 -3.2 -0.3
Note: Estimated regional impacts of climate change in 2060 (billions of 1998 USD/year).
Coastal damages assumes 67 cm of sea level rise in 2.5 degree scenario. Impacts are
beneficial if positive, harmful if negative.
At 5 degrees of warming the impact is more pronounced. The energy sector
now experiences damages in three regions, and the damages to the water sector
are higher. The total impact from warming is still positive in three regions,
though the benefits have declined compared to the 2.5 degree estimates.
Table 3.3: Mendelsohn’s Damage Estimates for T = 5◦ Warming
Agriculture Forestry Energy Coast Water Total
Northeast 1.8 2.6 -2.6 -0.2 -0.1 1.6
Midwest 3.6 1.0 -1.6 0.0 -0.5 2.4
Northern Plains 2.7 0.5 -1.2 0.0 -1.2 0.8
Northwest 1.7 -0.6 1.6 0.0 -5.7 -3.1
Note: Estimated regional impacts of climate change in 2060 (billions of 1998 USD/year).
Coastal damages assumes 100 cm of sea level rise in 5.0 degree scenario. Impacts are
beneficial if positive, harmful if negative.
Figure 3.2 plots the calibrated damage function. Damages are measured on
the vertical axis as a share of output, and the horizontal axis shows average
temperature in degrees Celsius. It is worth noting that we find very small
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damages for moderate changes in Canadian temperatures.
This is very different from the global average used in Nordhaus (2008), as
can be seen from Figure 3.3 which plots both our calibrated damage function
and that used in Nordhaus. However, Nordhaus takes into account damages
to market sectors, as well as damages from increased incidence of catastrophic
events, and damages to health, human settlements, and ecosystems. The es-
timates from Mendelsohn do not take into account catastrophic events, and
damages to health and ecosystems. Therefore, it may be that the Canadian
damage function in 3.2 reflects a lower bound, and that Canadian damages
from warming are higher.3
As Canada lies to the north of the U.S., the market benefits to Canadian
Agriculture and Forestry may be higher than for the U.S. regions. However,
in a recent report,4 the Canadian National Roundtable on the Environment
and the Economy (NRTEE) suggested that the Canadian Forestry sector may
actually experience damages from warming. Figure 3.4 shows the Canadian
damage function re-estimated using the Canadian climate damage estimates
from the Roundtable.5 The initial benefits from warming are much smaller for
the NRTEE damage function, but the climate damages are still small compared
to the global average.
3Appendix B add catastrophic events into the damage function, following Nordhaus and
Boyer (2000).
4Paying the Price: the Economic Impacts of Climate Change for Canada (2011)
5Appendix B provides a description of the NRTEE forestry damage estimates.
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3.3 The Model
The model is based on ANEMI, an integrated assessment model developed at
Western University. We model Canada as a small open economy that takes
energy prices and the global stock of atmospheric carbon as given. That is,
fossil fuel prices and the global mean temperature are endogenous variables in
the ROW region, but exogenous to the Canadian energy economy. The paths
for both of these variables (energy prices and temperature) are taken from
simulations of the global version of the ANEMI model.6
The world energy-economy model extends the neoclassical (Solow) growth
model to include an energy sector as well as the production of fossil fuels. A key
6A complete description of the global ANEMI model is available in Akhtar (2011).
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feature of the model is the endogenous allocation of energy production across
fossil fuels, hydro, nuclear, and alternative energy sources. This results in in-
dustrial green house emissions responding endogenously to both carbon taxes
and to shifts in the relative prices of fossil fuels.
Figure 3.5 outlines the causal structure diagram for the energy economy-
sector. In the model, the energy-economy sector takes Canadian mean temper-
ature and population as inputs, as well as an exogenously specified path for
fossil fuel endowments and the technology available to produce nuclear, hydro,
and alternative energy. The climate damage relationship (which is a function
of temperature) is similar to that of Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), and is repre-
sented by a quadratic function in global mean temperature.
Figure 3.5: Causal Diagram for Energy-Economy Sector
The energy-economy sector produces the final consumption/investment good
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as well as industrial emissions. Industrial emissions are calculated from the
burning of fossil fuels in producing energy services. Gross domestic product is
equal to final output, and depends on the world’s capital stock, labour force,
and energy resources.7 We assume that aggregate investment is equal to a
fraction s of output.
’Energy services’ used in the production of the final good is a composite good
aggregated from heat energy and electric energy. Heat energy is produced from
fossil fuels and alternative energy sources. Electric energy is produced from
fossil fuels, nuclear, and hydro power.
The production of output is negatively affected by climate damages. The
global mean temperature represents a negative feedback to the economic sys-
tem from industrial emissions through climate damages.
3.3.1 Government
Climate policies are implemented by a government. The government can im-
plement carbon taxes on energy consumption, and rebates these tax revenues
lump-sum to the household. We assume a set of fuel specific taxes, τi, which
depend on the emission intensity of each fuel type i. Finally, T is the sum of tax
revenues from carbon. Then, PEE − T is the household’s income from selling
energy services to the firm net of taxes.
7Note that energy production in the model is an intermediate good.
67
3.3.2 The Representative Household
The model economy is populated by a stand-in household. The household has
preferences over an aggregate consumption good, which can be represented by
the utility function:
U(C) = ln(C) (3.1)
where C is the final consumption good. The household supplies labour, L,
inelastically to the market. We assume that the household owns the world’s
capital stock and natural resources. Thus, the consumer rents the capital to the
firm, earning income rK, where r is the interest rate and K is the aggregate
capital stock in the economy. The consumer also sells energy services to the
firm, earning income PEE − T , where E is aggregate energy services, and PE is
the price of aggregate energy services. Given prices, the household maximizes
utility subject to its budget constraint:
rK + wL+ PEE − T ≥ C + I (3.2)





Note that since the price of energy services PE is a final price, it includes
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the effect of taxes on intermediate fossil fuels. Hence, one has to subtract the
value of taxes from household income.
Investment, I, is assumed to follow a Solow investment rule where a frac-
tion s of output, Y , is invested into new capital each period:
I = sY (3.4)
3.3.3 Final Good Production
Production of final output is represented by a stand-in firm which employs a
CES production technology. The firm hires labour, capital, and energy services
from the stand in household and produces the final consumption/investment
good. The aggregate production function is:
Y = ΩA
(
ω(KαL(1−α))γ + (1 − ω)Eγ) 1γ (3.5)
where A is total factor productivity (TFP), and 1/(1 − γ) is the elasticity of
substitution between value added and the energy composite. We follow Nord-








Aggregate energy services, E, is modeled as a composite good produced from
heat energy and electric energy:
E =
(
λEθH + (1 − λ)EθEl
) 1
θ (3.7)
Here, EH is total heat energy produced, and EEl is total electricity produced.
The elasticity of substitution is determined by the parameter θ, and λ is the
CES share parameter.
3.3.5 Electric Energy Production
Electric energy is produced from fossil fuels, nuclear and hydro power. Nuclear
and hydro power are assumed to follow an exogenous path, as both depend
heavily on policy and regulatory decisions. Each period, the representative
firm solves the following problem:
min
FEl,i

































, for i = 1, 2, 3. (3.10)
That is, given the capital stocks for fossil fuels and the nuclear and hydro
power available, the representative firm chooses FEl,Coal, FEl,Oil, and FEl,Nat.Gas
to minimize the average total cost of electricity. Here, AEl is a productivity
term specific to electricity production, FEl,i is the fuel input used for fuel type i
in electricity production, and ϑ is the CES elasticity parameter.
The functions αi, for the fossil fuels, are decreasing in the fuel-to-capital
ratio. Inside a period this assumption implies diminishing returns, as capital
is a fixed factor. The parameters a4 and a5 are fixed. The parameters ω and gi
are used to calibrate the relative levels of fossil fuels in electricity production.
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3.3.6 Heat Energy Production
The structure for production of heat energy is symmetric to the production
of electric energy. We assume that heat energy is produced from fossil fuels





















There is no capital in the heat energy sector. The capital for heat energy
comprises part of the aggregate capital for the economy. The firm chooses
FH,Coal, FH,Oil, FH,Nat.Gas, and FH,Alt. to minimize the average total cost of heat
energy. Here, AH is a productivity term specific to heat energy production, FH,i
is the input of fuel type i for heat energy production, βi is the CES weight for
fuel type i, and ϑ pins down the elasticity of substitution.
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3.3.7 Fossil Fuel Price Functions
The fossil fuel price functions are increasing in the ratio of the reserve value at
its base year relative to its current value.
PFi,t = τi,t + PFi,t=1980
(





Here, subscripts i and t refer to the fossil fuel type and the year respectively.
PFi,t is the fuel price, τi,t is the fuel specific carbon tax, PFi,t=1980 is the price of
fuel at the base year , Ri,t is the current reserve level, Ri,t=1980, is the base year
reserve level, and Di,t is the new discovery value. FEli,t and FHi,t is extraction
of fuel for electricity and heat energy production respectively.8 ρ < 0 is an
elasticity parameter.
This specification includes two key channels which impact the extraction
cost of fuel. First, the model assumes that marginal extraction costs increase as
the current reserves (Ri,t) falls relative to the base year. That is, higher levels
of extraction results in higher future prices. This upward pressure on prices
can be offset by new discoveries, which are assumed to have lower marginal
extraction costs than remaining stocks of known reserves. The paths for new
fossil fuel discoveries are taken as exogenous in the model.
8For the calibration we have chosen 1980 as our base year.
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3.3.8 Alternative Heat Energy Price Function
The price of alternative heat energy is represented by the function:




PFAlt.,t is the price, and FHAlt.,t is the quantity of alternative fuel used in
heat energy production. µ1,t and µ2,t are parameters. We assume that they are
decreasing, representing that the price alternative fuel is falling over time.
3.3.9 Extraction and Trade in Fossil Fuels
The structure for the production of energy in the regional model is the same as
in the global ANEMI model. However, since the prices of fossil fuels are exoge-
nous, there is no mechanism to clear the market for fossil fuels in the regional
energy economy. Demand and supply is determined separately. If supply is
greater than demand, the excess supply is exported. Vice versa, the excess
demand is met with imports. Extraction decision in the Canadian energy econ-
omy depends on the fossil fuel price, and are given by the inverse of the price
functions:
FTE,i,t = Ri,t +Di,t − Ri,t=1980
(





Here, FTE,i is the total extraction of fossil fuel type i at time t, given the
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current world price P Fi,t. Ri,t is the current reserve value, Ri,t=1980 is the reserve
value at the base year, Di,t is new discoveries, and PFi,t=1980 is the world price of
fossil fuel i at the base year. ρ is an elasticity parameter, and νi is a calibration
parameter adjusting the level of extraction.
Given the exogenous world price, demand for fossil fuels in the regional
model is given. We assume that net exports of fossil fuel i, NXi,t, is the differ-
ence between demand and total extraction each period. That is, net exports of
fossil fuel type i is equal to total extraction minus fuel used for the production
of heat energy and electric energy:
NXi,t = FTE,i,t − FH,i,t − FEl,i,t (3.16)
3.3.10 Energy Demand
In the model, final energy demand is from the final good producer. We assume
that the final good producer is competitive, and takes the price of the energy
composite as given when deciding how much to purchase. Thus, we solve for
the equilibrium price within each period such that final energy demand equals
final energy supply. At period t, capital and labour inputs are fixed. At period
t, capital and labour inputs are fixed. Thus, equilibrium demand for aggregate









E is the representative firm’s demand for aggregate energy services, K is
aggregate capital, L is the world’s labour force, and PE is the price of aggre-
gate energy services. α and β are the share parameters from the aggregate
production function.
3.3.11 Investment in Capital for Electricity Production
The available supply of investment funds for electricity production is assumed










Here Ki is the current capital stock used to produce electricity from energy
source i, which could be either a fossil fuel, nuclear or hydro power. K without
a subscript i is the aggregate capital stock for the economy.
Investment into new capital for electricity production follows an average
cost investment rule and is allocated by a built-in Vensim function called ’Allocate-
by-priority’. For investment into electricity capital in the energy sector, the
allocate-by-priority (ABP) function serves the purpose of a market clearing
mechanism. The ABP function in Vensim is based on the Wood algorithm for
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allocating a resource in scarce supply to competing orders or ’requests’.9 The
ABP function takes as inputs the supply of available investment funds to be
allocated, and the ’capacity’ and the ’priority’ of each order, representing the
size and competitiveness of the orders respectively.
As explained above, given the fixed quantity of investment funds available
inside a period, the market allocation depends on the size of the request and
relative priority given to each sector, and the width parameter. After testing
multiple approaches we decided to set the priorities for the sectors equal to
each other, and only focus on the request dimension. The intention behind
this decision is to simplify the calibration and to make the investment function
more transparent.
3.3.12 Average Cost Investment Rule
The demand for new investment funds for each energy source used in electricity
production is based on an average cost investment rule where the allocation is
determined by the ABP function. Given a fixed priority across energy sources,
the ’request’ function takes the following form:









The request for new investment funds is a function of ”replacement capital”
9The Wood algorithm was invented by William T. Wood.
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and the current capital share of the sector scaled by its relative average total
cost. Each period a share δ of existing capital depreciates, and we assume that
all sectors will ask for that capital to be replaced. The parameter ϕ is a weight-
ing factor that will reduce the request for replacement capital if the average
total cost exceeds some threshold value. The second term is the relative size of
the current capital stock for energy source i multiplied by its relative average
cost. This implies that sectors with a lower average cost will have higher re-
quests. ATCEl is the average total cost of electricity, and ATCi is the average
total cost of energy source i.
Since the path for nuclear and hydro power is exogenous, the capital stock
used in production of nuclear and hydro power is also prescribed. The amount
needed for new capital for nuclear and hydro power is subtracted from the total
available for investment into electricity capital; what is left over is allocated to
the fossil fuel capital stocks using the ABP function.
3.4 Calibration of Energy Economy
To calibrate the model, we choose parameters to match the level and trend
in energy consumption, industrial emissions of GHGs, and economic activity
from 1980 to 2005. Historical energy data was collected from the Energy Infor-
mation Administration (EIA), the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI), and Statistics Canada.
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3.4.1 Calibration Strategy
We calibrate the model in two steps. First, we choose initial conditions, ex-
ogenous variables, and parameters. Given those assumption, we calibrate the
energy sector of the model to match fossil fuel consumption for the period 1980-
2005.
For each year in the calibration period we solve a system of equations where
{ gi, βi } i=1,2,3 is chosen to minimize the distance between fossil fuel consumption
in the model and the historical trend lines in the data.
The gi are parameters from the functional forms for the CES-weights in
electricity production function (equation 3.10), and the βi are the CES-weights
in the heat energy production function (equation 3.12). For the calibration
period we solve for these six parameters as part of the non-linear system of
equations that make up the energy economy. The calibration targets are the
observed trend lines of fossil fuel consumption in heat energy and electricity
production.
The calibration implies the relative quantities of fossil fuels used in produc-
tion of energy. Given these values, the productivity parameters are chosen so
as to match the levels of energy and economic output for the calibration period.











The set of parameters { νi } are chosen to minimize the change in the trend
for each of the fossil fuels in the period immediately following the calibration
stage.
3.4.2 Calibration of Global Model
The energy data for the global energy economy is from the U.S. Energy In-
formation Administration (EIA) and the World Bank’s World Development In-
dicators (WDI). From the EIA we collected data on fossil fuel reserves, fossil
fuel discoveries, total energy produced from fossil fuels, and total electricity
produced from nuclear and hydro power. From WDI we collected data on the
production of electricity from fossil fuels.
Energy stock variables are denoted in Gigajoules (GJ) and energy flow vari-
ables are denoted in GJ/year. The energy stock variables are the fossil fuel
reserves. The flow variables are fossil fuel discoveries, fossil fuel inputs into
production of heat and electric energy, alternative energy input into heat en-
ergy production, and nuclear and hydro power used to produce electricity. We
use conversion factors from the EIA to convert cubic feet of natural gas, short
tons of coal, and barrels of oil into GJ of energy.10
101cubic foot of natural gas = 0.001.0846 GJ, 1short ton of coal = 21.279 GJ, and 1 barrel of
oil = 6.119 GJ.
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3.4.3 Fossil Fuel Reserves and Discoveries
A key factor in our simulations is the projected path for future discovery of
fossil fuels in Canada.
The Canadian oil sands are a vast resource; however, economical, political,
and technological constraints make it very difficult to make a prediction about
what share of the oil sands will actually be extracted. Given these constraints,
we assume here that the total recoverable oil in Canada is about 410 billion
barrels. That is approximately 25% of the oil estimated to be in the Alberta oil
sands. In 2007, the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board estimated that about
10% of the oil was recoverable given the economic conditions and technology
available at that time.
For simplicity, we assume that future fossil fuel discoveries are known at
the beginning of time. Thus, the initial model reserves are the sum of expected
discoveries and the reported reserves in the base year. Thus, the initial re-
serves used in the model (column 1) are equal to the sum of the remaining
three columns in in Table 3.4 below.
The natural gas discoveries follow a similar assumption about improvement
in technology or increase in prices.
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Table 3.4: Fossil Fuel Reserves
1980 1980 1980 - 2005 2006 -
Fuel Type Assumed Initial (EIA & Disc. (EIA & Assumed
(Billion GJ) Reserves Model Stat. Canada) Stat. Canada) Discoveries
Conventional Oil 50 40 10
Oil Sands 2500 1180 1320
Conventional Natural Gas 530 77 133 320
Shale Gas 1120 1120
Coal 140 90 50
3.4.4 Energy Production
In energy production, the important parameters to consider are the elasticity
parameters from energy production functions and aggregation, and the param-
eters in the price functions.
In the production functions for heat energy and electric energy, the CES
elasticity parameters η and ϑ are set equal to 0.5, which implies an elasticity of
substation of 2. The elasticity parameter in aggregation of electricity and heat
energy, θ, is also set to 0.5.
The elasticity of substitution between fossil fuels, nuclear and hydro power
in the production of electricity captures differences in the ease with which gen-
eration can respond to short term fluctuating demand. Intuitively, it seems
that a unit of electricity produced from nuclear power is perfectly substitutable
with a unit of electricity produced from coal. However, different sources vary
in their ability to respond to demand fluctuations, thus it is not clear how sub-
stitutable energy sources are in the short run. Currently, we set µ and ϑ equal
to 0.5 A similar argument can be made for the elasticity of substitution in heat
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energy production, and the aggregation of heat energy and electricity.
The share parameter γ in the CES aggregator for heat and electric energy
is set to point 0.9.
The elasticity parameter for the fossil fuel price functions, ρ, is set to -0.4.
A lower value would make fossil fuel prices more responsive to depletion of the
fossil fuel reserves. The parameter value and the functional form for the price
functions are from an earlier version of the ANEMI energy sector (see Davies
and Simonovic (2009)).
The initial values for the parameters for the alternative energy price func-
tion, µ1 and µ2, were set equal to 3 and 5 respectively. The parameters decrease
linearly over time representing that alternative energy is becoming cheaper
over time as technology improves. For the calibration we had a target of 3%
alternative heat energy in 2005.
3.4.5 Investment
The relevant parameters for investment are the aggregate savings rate s, the
depreciation rate δ, and the replacement capital weighing factor ϕ. The aggre-
gate savings rate is set to 0.25, which means that 25% of the generic consump-
tion good produced is used for investment into new capital. The depreciation
rate is set to 0.1, which correspond to an annual depreciation rate of 10%.
The weighting factor for replacement capital is triggered when the average
total cost of producing electricity from a fossil fuel type is twice the weighted
average total cost of electricity. The value of ϕ is set to 0.5 which means that
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if the condition is true, then the request for replacement capital is only half
of the depreciated capital. The intuition behind this parameter is to improve
the adjustment process of the capital stock in electricity production from fossil
fuels in response to average cost changes.
3.4.6 Productivity Parameters
The model productivity parameters are the total factor productivity (TFP) A,
and the energy specific productivity terms for electricity and heat energy, AEl
and AH . The model also has several assumptions that can be interpreted as
implicit increases in productivity.
TFP is assumed to increase at a decreasing rate. TFP growth is 1.6% in
2005, 0.9% in 2050, and 0.6% in 2100. AEl and AH is assumed to grow linearly.
The assumption implies that they increase by approximately 1.35% in 2005,
0.9% in 2005, and 0.6% in 2100.
Implicit productivity increases are embedded in the assumptions on fossil
fuel discoveries, the price function of alternative heat energy, and the share
parameters in the aggregate production function.
Fossil fuel reserves are most commonly defined as the quantity that can be
extracted given the current price and available technology. In the assumptions
we have made about future discoveries of fossil fuels is an underlying assump-
tion about improvements in extraction technology which comes in addition to
our choice of A, AEl and AH .
The parameter paths for the price function for alternative heat energy have
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similar assumptions embedded in them as they are decreasing over time.
The sum of the share parameters from the aggregate production function,
α and β, are assumed to decrease over time. The assumption implies that the
share of energy services in final output is decreasing. The assumption here is
that technology improvements reduce the energy intensity of the economy as a
whole
3.5 Results
In this section we discuss the results of an illustrative experiment. To highlight
how Canada differs from the global average, we compare the results from our
Canadian economy to those of the ANEMI model for the same carbon tax policy.
A key message of the experiment is while there are significant benefits to the
world in moving to mitigate GHG emissions, the direct benefits to Canada are
much smaller.
3.5.1 Global Baseline from ANEMI
Before turning to the Canadian economy, it is worthwhile briefly discussing the
global projections that we take from the ANEMI model.
As Figure 3.6 shows, the baseline temperature projections implied by the
ANEMI model are comparable with a number of well known estimates of fu-
ture temperature change. This suggests that the global path of emissions and
temperature changes that we feed into our model are reasonable.
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Figure 3.6: Baseline Temperature Projections from ANEMI
3.5.2 Carbon Tax Impact on Canada
The thought experiment we focus on is based on the carbon tax required to
maintain the level of CO2e below 550 ppm. The path of the tax we consider
is computed using two additional restrictions. First, we assume that a carbon
capture and storage technology for coal fired electricity is available at a real
cost of $75 per tonne CO2e . Second, we assume that the tax is introduced in
2012 and is increased linearly until 2080. The resulting tax is plotted in Figure
3.7.
Figure 3.8 shows the difference between GDP per capita for the business
as usual case (the baseline run) and the carbon tax experiment for Canada
and the world economy. Initially, the carbon tax results in a lower level of
GDP, as higher energy prices result in lower energy consumption and thus
GDP. In Canada, this effect is not offset by reduced climate damages, since the
calibrated damage function for Canada initially features small positive effects.
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As a result, this carbon tax policy results in a much larger decline in the level
of GDP in Canada, with the trough in Canada in 2050 roughly 2.5% below the
business as usual case. In contrast, the largest decline in the global economy is
at less than 1% in 2020, with the carbon tax economy resulting in higher levels
of GDP per capita by 2045 than the business as usual case.
As an alternative way of highlighting the differential impact of this carbon
tax policy, we also compute the present value of this policy over 2012-2080 for
Canada and the world in trillions of 2005 Canadian dollars. Table 3.5 high-
lights two key messages. First, from a global perspective, a carbon tax that
keeps the stock of GHG below the 550 ppm mark yields positive net present
value even if one truncates the calculations in 2050 (the end of our simula-
tion). While the magnitude of the gains are decreasing in the discount rate
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used, even for a relatively high value of 5% the gains remain positive. How-
ever, the second message from Table 3.5 is less positive. From a Canadian
perspective, this carbon tax policy actually has a negative net present value.
This highlights the potentially different incentives facing Canada versus other
countries in adopting policies to mitigate GHG emissions.
Table 3.5: Cumulative Loss Benefit from Tax, 2012 - 2080 (2005 $ Trill.)




These differences are driven by two key forces. First, the climate damage
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functions for Canada and the world are very different. As discussed above,
the Canada damage function actually yields small benefits for slight increases
in temperature, whereas the global damage function features negative effects
that increase relatively quickly with temperature. The second key force is a
differential impact of a shift in the price of fossil fuels in Canada versus the
world economy. Since Canada is a net exporter of fossil fuels, the initial re-
duction in fossil fuel prices due to the carbon tax lowers fossil fuel exports and
this Canadian GDP. However, over time this effect is partially undone as the
reduced level of fossil fuel consumption leads to slightly lower fossil fuel prices
over the longer term than the business as usual case.
To better understand these mechanics, it is worthwhile to examine how both
total energy use and fossil fuel use respond to the carbon tax in the model. The
large decline in total energy used in the production of aggregate energy ser-
vices in the Canadian economy is visible in Figure 3.9. For the baseline, the
hump shape in total energy input is a result of increasing fossil fuel prices,
which are exogenously given, from the global model. Not surprisingly, the path
of industrial GHG emissions closely resembles that of total energy, with emis-
sions declining even faster than energy use as the carbon tax induces a shift
away from relatively more expensive fossil fuels towards alternative energy
sources (see Figure 3.10). As a result, energy intensity (energy per dollar of
GDP) declines significantly in response to the carbon tax (Figure 3.11).
The results in Figures 3.9 - 3.11 focus on the simulation up to 2050. After
2050, fossil fuel prices in the business as usual case begin to increase rapidly
as the stock of remaining reserves declines in size. This rapid increase in price
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leads to a similar effect of a carbon tax, and results in a significant reduction in
energy intensity. In contrast, the carbon tax economy features a much smaller
secular trend in the price of fossil fuels, as the reduction in fossil fuel consump-
tion induced by the carbon tax slows the depletion of reserves and thus delays
the market driven increase in their price. As a result, the level of energy in-
tensity in the business as usual case and the carbon tax tends to converge to a
similar level by 2080.
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We examine the relative benefits of policy aimed at mitigating GHG emissions
in Canada and globally. We find that while a carbon tax that holds the stock of
global emissions below the 550 ppm level would yield positive net benefits for
the world economy, the impact of such a tax on the Canadian economy would
be negative. This result is largely driven by our finding that the damages from
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Chapter 4
Remittances and Sectoral Factor
Allocation in Latin America
4.1 Introduction
Remittance payments to many developing economies are large. Net remit-
tances to Latin America and the Caribbean reached US 53 billion in 2009,
about 1.5% of the region’s gross national income.1 Indeed, for many countries,
remittance flows exceed international aid and foreign direct investment.
Recent empirical studies have found that these remittance flows are large
enough to impact (i.e. appreciate) the real exchange rate in remittance receiv-
ing countries, suggesting the presence of a Dutch Disease effect.2 (For exam-
ple Lartey, Mandelman, and Acosta (2012), Acosta, Lartey, and Mandelman
(2009), and Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004)). The Dutch Disease effect gen-
erated by remittance inflows leads to a reallocation of productive factors from
1World Bank, ”Migration and Remittances Factbook” (2011).
2The term ’Dutch disease’ was originally used to describe the difficulties faced by the man-
ufacturing sector in the Netherlands following the development of natural gas on a large scale
which triggered a major appreciation of the real exchange rate.
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the tradable to the non-tradable sector, which for many developing economies
may have significant implications for aggregate productivity and welfare.
The Dutch Disease mechanism works through the real exchange rate. Re-
mittance inflows increase household income and generally increase aggregate
demand, putting upward pressure on prices and wages. As the price of tradable
goods is restricted by the world price for tradables, the relative price of non-
tradable goods increases (i.e. the real exchange rate increases). With higher
prices in the non-tradable sector, remittance receiving economies experience
a shift of productive factors from the tradable to the non-tradable sector. This
shift of productive factors may cause a deterioration of the economy’s aggregate
productivity, and therefore a significant reduction of the benefits from remit-
tance inflows, if the productivity in the non-tradable sector is relatively low.
Duarte and Restuccia (2010) suggest that differences in labour productivity
levels between rich and poor countries are larger in services than in manu-
facturing, and low relative productivity in services explain all the experiences
of slowdown, stagnation, and decline in relative aggregate productivity across
countries. Thus, if the transfers are large, the Dutch Disease effect may sub-
stantially reduce the benefit from remittances for many developing countries.
In this paper I analyze how the aggregate productivity and welfare in the Latin
American and Caribbean economies are affected by remittance inflows.
To quantify the impact of remittance transfers on aggregate productivity
and welfare I develop a two-sector, small open economy model where remit-
tances are a function of migration. Linking remittance inflows to the migra-
tion decision is important because remittances are not a random process, but
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transfers to family members from workers who migrated in order to obtain
better economic opportunities abroad. In the model, the allocation of produc-
tive factors between sectors is affected by the remittance process through two
channels. First, out-migration reduces the size of the domestic labour force.
Second, the households experience an income effect associated with received
remittances. The increase in income induces an increase in aggregate demand,
and since the non-traded good can only be produced domestically, by definition,
the home country shifts productive factors from the traded sector and into the
non-traded sector. The associated fall in production of the traded good is off-
set by running a trade balance deficit through increasing imports of the traded
good. In the model, the trade balance deficit is matched exactly by the inflow
of remittance payments.
I calibrate my model to 33 Latin American and Caribbean Economies. The
year 2000 is the calibration base year, and I use CES share parameters to cali-
brate the debt-to-gdp ratio, investment-to-gdp ratio, and tradable sector share
for each country. To calibrate migration I use data from the U.S. census on per-
manent migrants to estimate a migration gravity equation and derive country
specific migration cost parameters. I find that relative wages and migrant net-
works are important in predicting migration shares in Latin American and the
Caribbean.
In the quantitative experiments I compare the benchmark calibration to a
counterfactual where there is no incentive to migrate. That is, for each country
I compare the benchmark steady state equilibrium to a recalibrated steady
state with zero migration and zero remittance inflows. The results suggest that
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Latin American and the Caribbean economies have experienced an increase in
consumption per capita by 9.1% on average as a result of remittance transfers.
My results further suggest that the benefits from remittance transfers could
be 33% higher in terms of increased GDP per capita, and 27% in terms of
increased consumption per capita, if the non-tradable sector productivity in-
creased to the tradable sector level. The benefit is mitigated by the shift of pro-
ductive resources into the less productive non-tradable sector. The remittance
transfers generate a Dutch Disease effect where the non-tradable sector share
increases by 6% on average, and by 15-20% for the high remittance countries.3
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: The remainder of Section 4.1
summarizes the relevant literature. Section 4.2 describes the model framework
in detail. In section 4.3 I discuss the calibration of the model, including the es-
timation of a migration gravity equation. Section 4.4 describes the benchmark
results and quantitative exercises. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.1.1 Literature Review
For workers’ remittances, recent research has focused on several aspects of
the receiving economies.4 Related to my work are Lartey, Mandelman, and
3In the sample, 10 out of the 33 countries are what I consider high remittance economies.
In 2000, they received remittance transfers in excess of 5% of GDP.
4For example Adams and Page (2005), Page and Plaza (2006) and Acosta, Calderon, Fajnzyl-
ber, and Lopez (2006, 2008) who explored the relationship between remittances and poverty,
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2006) and Calderon, Fajnzylber, and Lopez (2008) who investigated
remittance payments’ impact on growth, Rodrigues and Tiongson (2001) studying labour sup-
ply; and Cox-Edwards and Ureta (1998) looking at education.
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Acosta (2012), Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004), and Rajan and Subrama-
nian (2005), investigating the relationship between remittances and the Dutch
Disease.
Lartey, Mandelman, and Acosta use cross sectional data disaggregated by
sector to test for Dutch Disease effects. The authors consider data for the agri-
culture, manufacturing, and services sector and estimate a GMM in differences
distributed lag model, employing lagged values of explanatory variables as in-
struments to control for endogeneity. The authors find support for the existence
of Dutch Disease effects resulting from workers’ remittances.
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo examine the effect of remittance inflows on the
real exchange rate. Using a panel of 13 Latin American and Caribbean coun-
tries, they find that a doubling of remittance payments leads to an average
overvaluation of the real exchange rate of about 22 percent. They suggest
that the appreciation of the real exchange rate following a transfer can occur
through an income effect for leisure, and by raising the relative price of non-
traded goods. Interestingly, they also find that aid does not lead to the same
overvaluation of the real exchange rate. This suggests that public and private
transfers work through different mechanisms, and have different impacts on
recipient economies.
Rajan and Subramanian tests Dutch Disease channels using panel data on
real exchange rates and wages disaggregated by sector. The methodology ex-
ploits within and between country variations in industry sector growth. The
intuition is that if certain sectors are more affected by a mechanism, one way
to check if the mechanism is active is to see whether industries that might
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be more affected grow differentially. Thus, they rank industries by tradabil-
ity to explore if the wage pressure in given industries are higher in countries
that receive higher transfers. The industry level data is taken from the Indus-
trial Statistics Database (2003) of the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO). Contrary to Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, Rajan and
Subramanian find that aid causes an appreciation in the real exchange rate,
while remittances on the other hand do not. As an explanation, the authors
suggest that aid appreciates the real exchange rate through increased spend-
ing, causing an increase in prices on non-tradable goods. They further argue
that wages of worker types in limited supply (likely skilled labour in most de-
veloping countries) will increase. This effect will squeeze profits in the trad-
able sector, making the country less competitive in international markets. For
remittances they find no effect, and speculate that remittances increase the
demand for unskilled labour and traded goods, thus not appreciating the real
exchange rate.
More closely related to this chapter is Acosta, Lartey, and Mandelman (2009),
who develop and estimate a two-sector Dynamic Stochastic General Equilib-
rium (DSGE) open economy model to analyze the effect of remittances on de-
veloping economies. They test three approaches to the remittance process; first
leaving remittance inflows independent of conditions in the domestic economy,
second, a case where remittances are counter-cyclical, and third, a scenario
where remittances act like capital inflows and are driven by the remitter’s de-
sire to invest in the home country. The authors estimate their model using a
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Bayesian approach with macroeconomic data for El Salvador and find that re-
mittances generally lead to a Dutch Disease phenomenon. The most important
distinction between their paper and my work is the treatment of the remit-
tance transfer process. Acosta, Lartey, and Mandelman let remittances follow
exogenous processes, whereas I model the link between migration and remit-
tances endogenously. The benefit of my approach is that it allows for analysis of
the relationship between migration and remittances, and highlights how differ-
ences in this relationship manifests themselves in different patterns of factor
allocation across countries.
4.2 The Model
To quantify the impact of remittance transfers on factor allocation, aggregate
productivity, and welfare, I develop a two-sector small open economy model
with an endogenous migration decision. Labour is mobile across sectors and
between countries (i.e. endogenous migration). The economy produces a non-
tradable good, and a tradable composite good by aggregating domestic inter-
mediate goods with imported intermediate goods. The model is populated by
a representative household and representative firms in each sector. Time is
discrete, and the economic agents live forever.
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4.2.1 Household Behavior
Household preferences are represented by a period utility function in the form
of a CES function nested in a CRRA function. Each period the representa-
tive household chooses tradable and non-tradable consumption, the labour and










 , θ < 1, 0 < β < 1, 0 < ω < 1, 0 < σ (4.1)
where cT,t and cN,t is consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods, ω is
the intratemporal share parameter and 1/(1 − θ) is the elasticity of substitu-
tion for tradable and non-tradable consumption, σ pins down the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, and β is the discount factor. The household has a fixed
time endowment each period, which is perfectly divisible between working at
home and migrating. The household’s time endowment is normalized to 1, and
I abstract from any labour-leisure choice.
The household chooses the stock of migrants optimally, taking into account
the relative foreign wage and costs associated with migrating. When abroad,
the migrants send remittance transfers to family and relatives in the small
open economy. Net remittances, R(mt), appear as real tradable goods, and the
remittance function takes the following form:





where mt is the share of the household’s labour supply that migrates and w∗t is
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the exogenous foreign wage. The parameter τ captures the cost of international
transfers of capital. For each unit of remittances sent to the home country, a
fraction τ ’melts’ on the way. κ and φ are country specific cost and curvature
parameters which are calibrated employing a migration gravity equation. ψ is
a calibration parameter to match the share of remittances in GDP.
The household can borrow or lend in the international financial market by
a risk-free bond. The law of motion for debt, dt, takes the following form:
dt+1 + tbt + q
∗
tR(mt) = (1 + r
d
t )dt (4.3)
Here, dt is current debt with interest rate rdt , dt+1 is next period’s debt, and
tbt is the current period’s trade balance. q∗t is the price per unit of the tradable
good received as remittances.
The above equation is the Balance of Payments Identity in the model. One
way to interpret this equation is that current debt and interest payments can
be satisfied by new debt, a trade surplus, or remittance transfers. However,
since dt+1 − (1 + rdt )dt is relatively small in the data, the more appropriate in-
terpretation is that remittance inflows finance the economy’s trade deficit.
I assume that the representative household owns the capital stock and rents
capital to the firms. Capital depreciates at rate δ each period. For each period
t, investment in sector j follows:
it,j = kt+1,j − (1 − δ)kt,j, j = T,N (4.4)
The household’s period budget constraint can be expressed as:
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+ q∗tR(mt) + dt+1, j = T,N
Here, the subscript j indicates either the tradable or non-tradable sector.
nt,j are labour services supplied to the firms, wt,j is the wage, and rt,j is the
rental rate of capital in sector j. pT,t and pN,t are the prices of the consumption
goods in the tradable and the non-tradable sectors.
4.2.2 Production
The economy produces two final goods, tradable and non-tradable, for con-
sumption and investment by the household. Each good is produced by com-
petitive firms. The tradable good is produced from domestic and imported in-
termediate goods, aggregated by a CES function:
yT,t =
(
γxηH,t + (1 − γ)xηIM,t
)1/η , 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, η≤1 (4.6)
xH,t is the amount of the domestically produced intermediate good and xIM,t the
imported intermediate good used to produce the tradable composite. γ is the
CES share parameter, and 1/(1 − η) is the elasticity of substitution between the
domestic and imported intermediate goods. The domestic intermediate good is




(1−α) , 0 < α < 1 , AT > 0 (4.7)
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Here, α is capital’s share in output, and AT is the sector specific labour produc-
tivity. The representative firm maximizes profits:
max
kT,t,nT,t
qtxt − rkT,tkT,t − wT,tnT,t (4.8)
where qt is the price of the domestic intermediate good.





(1−α) , 0 < α < 1 , AN > 0 (4.9)
where α is again capital’s share in output, and AN is the sector specific labour
productivity. Each period the representative firm maximizes profits:
max
kN,t,nN,t
pN,tyN,t − rkN,tkN,t − wN,tnN,t (4.10)
4.2.3 Trade and Market Clearing Conditions











, 0 ≤ γ∗ ≤ 1, η∗ ≤ 1 (4.11)
Here, q∗t/qt is the terms of trade for the intermediate goods in the tradable
sector. From the perspective of the foreign economy, γ∗ is the CES share pa-
rameter, while 1/(1 − η∗) is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and
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imported intermediate goods. The size of the foreign economy, x∗t , and the for-
eign price of the intermediate good, q∗t , are exogenous.
In the small open economy, market clearing for the tradable intermediate
good implies:
xt = xH,t + xEX,t (4.12)
That is, xH,t units are used to produce the tradable good at home, and xEX,t
units are exported.
Each period, the household has a time endowment normalized to 1. Market
clearing implies:
nT,t + nN,t +mt = 1 (4.13)
4.2.4 Steady State Equilibrium
The model represents a small open economy which takes the price of the im-
ported intermediate good, q∗t , and the foreign wage, w∗t , as given. The interest
rate, rdt , is pinned down by the discount factor from the utility function. Drop-
ping the time subscripts we can define the steady state equilibrium:
Definition 1. Given (q∗, w∗, rd), a Steady State Equilibrium is an allocation for
the households (cT , cN , iT , iN , m, d), an allocation for the firms (yT , yN , x, xH ,
xEX , xIM , nT , nN , kT , kN ), and prices (pT , pN , q, w, rk) such that:
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1. The household’s allocation is the solution to the household’s problem
2. The firms’ allocation is the solution to the firms’ problems
3. Markets Clear:
Tradable Goods Market: cT + iT = yT
Non-Tradable Goods Market: cN + iN = yN
Intermediate Goods Market: x = xH + xEX
Balance of Payments: qxEX − q∗xIM +R(m) = rdd
Labour Market: nT + nN +m = 1
4.3 Parameterization & Calibration Strategy
This section summarizes the model parameter values and the calibration strat-
egy employed in the paper. I calibrate the model to 33 Latin American and
Caribbean Economies. Each period corresponds to a year, and the benchmark
corresponds to the year 2000. Below, I outline the calibration of parameters
commonly found in the literature and the parameters specific to my model.
Next, I explain the estimation of the migration gravity equation.
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4.3.1 Parameterization & Calibration
For parameters typically found in open economy models I use values from the
literature. Table 4.1 lists the benchmark values for the parameters. α, capital’s
share of output,5 is set to 0.33 and σ, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, is
set to 2.0. β = 0.96 implies an annual risk-free interest rate of 4%. Similarly δ =
0.1 implies an annual depreciation rate of 10%. θ, the elasticity of substitution
between tradable and non-tradable goods in the period utility function, follows
Stockman and Tesar (1995), and is set to 0.44. The other Armington elasticity
parameters are set to 2.0 which is within the typical range for this class of
models.
Table 4.1: Benchmark Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description
α 0.33 Capital share in output
β 0.96 Discount factor
δ 0.1 Depreciation rate
σ 2.0 Risk aversion parameter
1/(1 − θ) 0.44 Es tradable and non-tradable goods
1/(1 − η) 2.0 Es domestic and imported intermediates
1/(1 − η∗) 2.0 Es foreign import demand
5Income shares to capital and labour differ across countries. Unfortunately, data availabil-
ity is a problem for many countries in Latin American and the Caribbean. However, Gollin




The CES share parameters from the period utility function, ωj, the CES aggre-
gator for the tradable composite good, γj, and the CES share parameter from
the foreign import demand equation, γ∗j , are included as variables when solv-
ing for the steady state to match three country specific moments. Table 4.2
lists the net external debt as a share of GDP, the gross investment as a share
of GDP, and the tradable sector as a share of GDP for each country. Data on net
external debt, investment, and GDP are 9-year averages around the year 2000,
and are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Data on
the tradable sector are from the United Nations’ National Income and Prod-
uct Accounts for the year 2000. The tradable sectors are Agriculture, hunting,
forestry, and fishing, Mining and quarrying, and Manufacturing. The relative
U.S. wage w∗t/wt is calculated using real GDP per capita in constant 2000 $US
from the World Bank’s WDI.
For many of the Latin American and Caribbean economies, data on produc-
tivity by sector is not readily available. I use data from the World Bank’s WDI
on value added by sector and employment shares by sector to construct AN/AT .
As expected, the productivity in the non-tradable sector is lower than the trad-
able sector productivity for most of the countries in the sample. However, there
are a few outliers (i.e. Peru and Venezuela), where the productivity in the non-
tradable sector appears to be twice that of the tradable sector. But, because
Peru and Venezuela receive relatively small remittance inflows as a share of
GDP, they will only have a negligible impact on the overall results.
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Antigua & Barbuda 0.55 0.22 0.12 1.46 0.88
Argentina 0.50 0.22 0.23 1.61 1.55
Aruba 0.55 0.24 0.27 0.85 0.94
Barbados 0.55 0.23 0.16 1.50 0.68
Belize 0.74 0.29 0.25 1.87 0.75
Bolivia 0.69 0.18 0.40 2.00 0.57
Brazil 0.37 0.17 0.20 1.85 0.72
Chile 0.50 0.21 0.29 1.78 1.34
Colombia 0.34 0.14 0.29 1.92 0.91
Costa Rica 0.29 0.18 0.35 1.82 0.92
Cuba 0.55 0.12 0.21 1.90 0.73
Dominica 0.50 0.21 0.19 1.79 0.64
Dominican Republic 0.19 0.20 0.37 1.90 1.17
Ecuador 0.83 0.20 0.41 1.99 0.93
El Salvador 0.34 0.17 0.36 1.93 0.88
Grenada 0.39 0.35 0.13 1.76 0.63
Guatemala 0.20 0.16 0.37 1.96 0.52
Guyana 1.91 0.22 0.51 2.01 1.38
Haiti 0.32 0.13 0.27 2.04 0.94
Honduras 0.76 0.26 0.35 2.00 0.57
Jamaica 0.52 0.23 0.26 1.86 0.78
Mexico 0.26 0.21 0.26 1.72 0.59
Nicaragua 1.71 0.29 0.39 2.02 0.63
Panama 0.57 0.21 0.17 1.83 0.52
Paraguay 0.44 0.17 0.38 1.99 0.68
Peru 0.54 0.20 0.31 1.94 2.30
St. Kitts & Nevis 0.41 0.49 0.18 1.56 0.37
St. Lucia 0.31 0.30 0.12 1.79 0.53
St. Vincent 0.49 0.23 0.16 1.85 0.63
Suriname 0.55 0.22 0.21 1.95 1.62
Trinidad & Tobago 0.55 0.16 0.37 1.69 1.62
Uruguay 0.37 0.14 0.19 1.66 1.16
Venezuela 0.36 0.21 0.42 1.78 2.21
111
The iceberg transaction cost, τ , is set to 0.1. That is, if a person wants to
send $100 from the U.S. to his family somewhere in Latin America, the finan-
cial intermediary takes $10. The World Bank has collected data on the cost of
sending remittances, and in 2011, the average fee for sending $200 from the
U.S. to a selected sample of Latin American countries was around 5 percent de-
pending on method of transfer and recipient country.6 I choose τ = 0.1 because
the model is calibrated to the year 2000, and the cost of sending remittances
has decreased over time.
4.3.3 Estimating the Migration Gravity Equation
To calibrate the migration cost parameters I use the structure of my model to
inform the estimation equation. Given the migration-remittance relationship
in the model, I choose a specific functional form for the cost function κ.
The net remittance flows in the model follow:





Here, R(mt) is the net remittance inflow, mt is the stock of migrants residing
abroad, w∗t is the exogenously given foreign wage, κ and φ are country specific




N−1,tεt, then, in the
household’s problem, by taking first order conditions with respect to mt, taking
6The World Bank provides information on the cost of sending remittances from the U.S.
to Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru. Their data is available quarterly
from 2009 to 2012, however, several countries have missing data. The data is available on their
website: http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/.
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logs and rearranging, we obtain:
ln(mt) = β0 + β1ln(ψ(1 − τ)w∗t − wt) + β2ln(X1,t) + ...+ βN ln(XN−1,t) + εˆt (4.15)
Where
β0 = − 1
(φ − 1) (ln(φ) + ln(α0)) (4.16)
β1 =
1
(φ − 1) (4.17)
βi = − 1
(φ − 1)αi−1, for i = 2, ..., N (4.18)
εˆt = ln(εt) (4.19)
To estimate 4.15 I use data on immigrants from 33 Latin American coun-
tries to the U.S. from 1960 to 2000. The stock of migrants variable, mt, is the
foreign born population in the U.S. as a share of the domestic population. The
data on foreign born nationals is from the U.S. Census and the population data
is from the World Bank’s WDI. I use data in 10 year period intervals due to the
availability of the U.S. census.
The explanatory variables in the gravity equation are the wage gap between
the domestic country and the U.S., and the country specific migration costs rep-
resented by the Xis in the functional form chosen for κ. Here, I include the size
of the migrants’ network in the U.S., plus a set of typical gravity equation vari-
ables such as distance, and indicators representing English, Spanish, and Por-
tuguese language, borders, island, inflation, and unemployment. The distance
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variable is geodesic distance between nations’ capitals, collected from a gravity
data set available from the World Bank.7 The migrant network variable is the
10-year lagged value of mt. For the wage differential, w∗t − wt, I use data on real
GDP per capita in constant 2000 $US from the World Bank’s WDI.
Due to the lack of data for some countries in 1960 and 1970 I have an un-
balanced panel. I run a pooled OLS regression with year and country dummies
for sensitivity. Table 4.3 presents the estimation results. For the full sample,
the sub-sample for the year 2000, and with time fixed effects the results are
fairly consistent. The estimation results with country fixed effects differ from
the other columns, likely because the panel is unbalanced or because of the
small sample size.
As expected, the coefficients on the Wage Differential, Migrant Network,
and English Language variables are positive, and the coefficient on the Dis-
tance variable negative. Spanish and Portuguese language indicator variables
were tested, but did not have a statistically significant impact on the estima-
tion results. Similarly, border and island indicators did not influence the re-
sults. Inflation and unemployment controls were also found insignificant.
After obtaining (β0, β1, β2, ..., βN ), I use equations (4.16), (4.17), and (4.18) to
solve for (α0, α1, ..., αN−1, φ). With these values I compute the country specific
cost parameter κ. The results are presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.
Two main observations stand out in Table 4.5. The first is that non-English
speaking countries in South America, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
7The data set is described in detail in Nicita and Olarreaga (2006).
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Table 4.3: Gravity Equation Estimation Results
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Full Sample Year 2000 Full Sample Full Sample
Wage 0.9618 0.7996 0.5358 1.9791
Differential (0.1673) (0.2756) (0.2752) (0.2032)
Migrant 0.6830 0.8542 0.7320 0.1729
Network (0.0520) (0.0548) (0.0550) (0.0806)
Distance -0.7429 -0.3689 -0.6046 -4.8099
(0.1646) (0.1507) (0.1447) (0.7135)
English 0.6973 0.3097 0.6403 5.9059
Language (0.1716) (0.1381) (0.1569) (0.8472)
Constant -4.6794 -5.0745 -1.3822 14.836
(1.8264) (2.8055) (3.0464) (4.7012)
Time F. E. NO NO YES NO
Country F. E. NO NO NO YES
Observations 123 32 123 123
Adj. R-squared 0.9027 0.9758 0.9214 0.9301
Table 4.4: Phi: Calculated Migration Curvature Parameter
Full Sample Year 2000 Time F.E. Country F.E.
2.04 2.32 1.51 2.87
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Table 4.5: Kappa: Calculated Migration Cost Parameters
Country Full Sample Year 2000 Time F.E. Country F.E.
Antigua & Barbuda 0.59 0.10 2.03 0.02
Argentina 32.78 26.06 45.27 25.40
Aruba 2.84 1.14 3.13 0.33
Barbados 1.02 0.21 3.42 0.04
Belize 0.95 0.23 1.93 0.04
Bolivia 17.91 12.48 20.89 8.83
Brazil 88.49 146.89 31.19 185.25
Chile 25.22 17.70 40.05 15.55
Colombia 8.19 5.15 6.19 2.33
Costa Rica 5.72 2.89 6.09 1.16
Cuba 1.05 0.35 0.85 0.06
Dominica 0.80 0.15 2.68 0.03
Dominican Republic 1.88 0.71 1.72 0.16
Ecuador 6.75 3.46 8.04 1.54
El Salvador 1.38 0.36 2.89 0.08
Grenada 1.14 0.25 3.51 0.06
Guatemala 3.30 1.46 3.16 0.44
Guyana 1.55 0.24 18.56 0.08
Haiti 2.46 1.11 1.67 0.28
Honduras 3.37 1.54 2.96 0.46
Jamaica 0.84 0.20 1.45 0.03
Mexico 1.89 0.60 3.00 0.15
Nicaragua 2.25 0.78 3.24 0.21
Panama 2.25 0.73 3.92 0.20
Paraguay 50.71 56.94 35.88 61.46
Peru 14.59 9.65 16.46 6.15
St. Kitts & Nevis 0.83 0.18 2.18 0.03
St. Lucia 2.02 0.65 3.36 0.17
St. Vincent 1.38 0.35 3.33 0.08
Suriname 18.87 17.73 8.99 11.13
Trinidad & Tobago 1.57 0.40 4.15 0.10
Uruguay 16.10 8.40 42.31 6.45
Venezuela 18.42 20.61 4.93 11.65
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Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela have high mi-
gration costs. This is not surprising as these countries are relatively far away
from the U.S., do not speak English, and they have relatively large populations,
reducing the positive impact of the network variable. Second, English speak-
ing countries with relatively small populations have very low migration costs
according to this estimation. This applies primarily to the British West Indies.
Given the values for κ and φ, the parameter ψ is set to match the share of
remittances in GDP for each country.
In the quantitative exercises that follow I will use parameters estimated
from the Year 2000 sub-sample. I choose these parameters because the estima-
tion results had the best fit, and because the rest of the model is calibrated to
the year 2000.
4.4 Model Results
This section uses the model to quantitatively assess the impact of remittance
inflows on receiving economies. I restrict attention to Latin America and the
Caribbean due to the relative homogeneity in geography, demographics, and
migration patterns. The U.S. is the main destination for migrants from this
region, and data on foreign-born residents is available from the U.S. census.
I first present the benchmark model results for the sample of 33 Latin
American and Caribbean countries, and discuss the model’s predictions. I then
present counterfactual experiments to quantify the impact of migration and
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remittance inflows on factor allocation, aggregate productivity, and welfare for
each country. Finally, I simulate the model to examine how benefits from re-
mittance inflows vary with the relative non-tradable sector productivity.
4.4.1 Model Benchmark
Figure 4.1 shows the model’s predicted migration stock in the U.S. relative
to the domestic population compared to data. Each dot represents a Latin
American or Caribbean economy. A perfect model fit would have each point
lie exactly on the 45◦ line. Despite the simple migration cost function, the
benchmark values are clustered along the 45◦ line. The corresponding values
are presented in table 4.6 together with the remittance share of GDP which is
matched exactly by the model.
Table 4.2 lists the benchmark debt-to-GDP ratio, investment-to-GDP ratio,
tradable sector share, and the relative productivity of the non-tradable sector
for all the countries in the sample. In 2000, the average debt-to-GDP ratio for
Latin America and the Caribbean is 0.55, and the average investment-to-GDP
ratio is 0.22. The debt and investment ratios are fairly uniform across the re-
gion, except for Guyana and Nicaragua which have debt problems, with debt
amounting to almost double their GDP. There is some variation in the trad-
able sector share, depending on the reliance on tourism which is an important
industry for many countries in the region. A handful of the island economies
have tradable sector shares around 15%.
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Source: U.S. Census - Foreign-born population in the U.S. as a share of domestic population,
2000
For the region, the average relative non-tradable productivity is 0.95, mean-
ing that the productivity in the non-tradable sector is 5% lower than the trad-
able sector productivity. Leaving out the outliers Peru and Venezuela, the aver-
age drops to 0.86, and for the group of high remittance countries (Rem./GDP >
0.05) the average is 0.75. This is an important point when considering the im-
pact of remittances on recipient economies, as one of the effects of remittance
transfers is a reallocation of productive factors from the tradable sector to the
non-tradable sector.
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Table 4.6: Benchmark Remittances and Migration
Migration Migration
Country Rem/GDP Model Data
Antigua & Barbuda 2.6 11.6 16.0
Argentina 0.0 1.1 0.3
Aruba 0.4 1.1 2.9
Barbados 4.5 11.2 18.0
Belize 3.2 27.1 16.7
Bolivia 1.5 1.3 0.6
Brazil 0.3 0.4 0.1
Chile 0.0 1.5 0.5
Colombia 1.6 2.0 1.2
Costa Rica 0.9 3.3 1.8
Cuba 2.5 5.9 7.4
Dominica 5.0 14.9 21.0
Dominican Republic 7.7 10.3 7.4
Ecuador 8.3 3.7 2.2
El Salvador 13.4 9.9 13.8
Grenada 8.9 24.9 25.9
Guatemala 3.1 3.6 4.2
Guyana 3.8 25.6 25.5
Haiti 15.8 5.3 4.7
Honduras 6.8 6.5 4.2
Jamaica 9.9 21.5 19.5
Mexico 1.3 6.3 9.2
Nicaragua 8.1 10.7 4.6
Panama 0.1 5.4 4.5
Paraguay 3.9 0.6 0.2
Peru 1.3 3.3 1.0
St. Kitts & Nevis 7.1 20.0 20.2
St. Lucia 3.7 13.9 10.8
St. Vincent 5.7 16.3 14.0
Suriname 0.1 2.6 0.3
Trinidad & Tobago 0.5 15.0 13.8
Uruguay 0.0 1.1 0.7
Venezuela 0.0 2.0 0.5
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4.4.2 Remittances and Factor Allocation
In this section I use the model to quantitatively examine the impact of re-
mittance inflows on the Latin American and Caribbean economies. For each
country I take the benchmark steady state equilibrium and compare it to the
steady state where the exogenous foreign wage is set to zero. With no incentive
to migrate, migration and remittances are zero, and the differences between
the steady states can be attributed to the joint effect of migration and remit-
tance transfers. I focus on the changes in the allocation of labour across sectors,
GDP, GNP, and the components of GDP per capita.
The first column in table 4.7 shows the remittance share in GDP in the
benchmark calibration. The following three columns show the percentage change
in the non-tradable labour share, GDP, and GNP, going from the zero remit-
tance steady state to the benchmark. I assume that migration is permanent,
and only net remittances received are counted in GNP.
The first important observation is that every country experiences a relative
shift of productive factors from the tradable sector into the non-tradable sector.
Figure 4.2 shows that there is a nearly perfect linear relationship between the
percentage increase in the non-tradable labour share and remittances relative
to GDP in the benchmark. This is consistent with the Dutch Disease mecha-
nism, predicting real exchange rate appreciation and factor reallocation as a
result of capital inflows.
The second observation to take away from table 4.7 is that GDP, and in
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Table 4.7: %∆ in Non-Tradable labour share, GDP, and GNP
Non-Tradable
Country Rem/GDP Labour-Share GDP GNP
Antigua & Barbuda 2.6 3.9 -7.7 -5.3
Argentina 0.0 0.1 -0.9 -0.8
Aruba 0.4 0.6 -0.9 -0.4
Barbados 4.5 6.6 -7.4 -3.2
Belize 3.2 8.2 -20.3 -17.7
Bolivia 1.5 1.9 -1.0 0.4
Brazil 0.3 0.3 -0.3 0.0
Chile 0.0 0.2 -1.1 -1.1
Colombia 1.6 2.0 -1.5 0.0
Costa Rica 0.9 1.4 -2.6 -1.7
Cuba 2.5 3.4 -4.1 -1.7
Dominica 5.0 7.7 -10.4 -5.9
Dominican Republic 7.7 11.5 -7.5 -0.4
Ecuador 8.3 11.2 -2.7 5.3
El Salvador 13.4 18.1 -7.1 5.4
Grenada 8.9 17.0 -14.6 -6.9
Guatemala 3.1 4.0 -2.9 0.1
Guyana 3.8 7.9 -19.4 -16.3
Haiti 15.8 19.7 -2.6 12.8
Honduras 6.8 9.8 -4.8 1.6
Jamaica 9.9 16.9 -14.9 -6.4
Mexico 1.3 2.2 -4.9 -3.6
Nicaragua 8.1 13.8 -7.6 -0.1
Panama 0.1 0.5 -4.2 -4.0
Paraguay 3.9 4.5 -0.6 3.3
Peru 1.3 2.2 -2.3 -1.0
St. Kitts & Nevis 7.1 10.4 -18.7 -13.0
St. Lucia 3.7 5.7 -9.6 -6.3
St. Vincent 5.7 8.9 -10.6 -5.6
Suriname 0.1 0.4 -2.0 -1.8
Trinidad & Tobago 0.5 2.6 -11.3 -10.9
Uruguay 0.0 0.1 -0.8 -0.8
Venezuela 0.0 0.2 -1.5 -1.4
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Table 4.8: %∆ in GDP Per Capita
Country GDPpc Cpc Ipc EXPpc IMPpc
Antigua & Barbuda 4.5 6.3 16.2 -19.3 8.3
Argentina 0.3 0.3 0.9 -0.1 0.6
Aruba 0.3 0.8 1.0 -1.5 0.7
Barbados 4.3 9.1 17.0 -22.5 10.3
Belize 9.4 11.8 34.8 -10.5 23.1
Bolivia 0.2 2.1 1.3 -2.7 1.7
Brazil 0.1 0.4 0.5 -1.2 0.4
Chile 0.4 0.4 1.2 0.0 0.8
Colombia 0.5 2.5 2.1 -4.3 2.3
Costa Rica 0.8 2.1 2.9 -1.8 2.4
Cuba 1.9 5.1 6.8 -10.1 5.7
Dominica 5.3 11.4 20.6 -19.7 14.1
Dominican Republic 3.2 14.2 10.5 -16.3 14.9
Ecuador 1.0 12.0 4.0 -15.9 9.2
El Salvador 3.1 21.4 12.4 -23.4 20.2
Grenada 13.8 20.0 60.3 -46.4 30.2
Guatemala 0.8 4.6 3.8 -5.9 4.3
Guyana 8.3 14.9 25.7 1.4 38.9
Haiti 2.8 23.1 12.1 -31.4 20.9
Honduras 1.7 10.6 8.6 -15.5 9.1
Jamaica 8.5 23.0 33.5 -26.4 29.7
Mexico 1.6 3.1 5.8 -4.4 3.9
Nicaragua 3.5 15.1 14.0 -18.5 15.8
Panama 1.3 1.2 4.2 -0.9 2.3
Paraguay 0.0 4.5 1.3 -7.5 3.1
Peru 1.0 2.9 2.8 -4.5 3.1
St. Kitts & Nevis 1.5 8.4 10.8 -35.1 2.7
St. Lucia 5.0 7.0 19.7 -26.8 8.8
St. Vincent 6.8 12.9 27.1 -27.1 16.5
Suriname 0.6 0.7 2.0 -0.6 1.3
Trinidad & Tobago 4.3 6.6 13.6 0.9 11.3
Uruguay 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.5
Venezuela 0.5 0.6 1.5 0.5 1.6
Average 3.0 7.9 11.5 -12.1 9.7
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most cases GNP decrease. Naturally because parts of the labour force have mi-
grated. However, GNP increases for a few high remittance countries, for exam-
ple Ecuador, El Salvador, and Haiti. This means that net remittance transfers
exceed the aggregate income loss from migration. Part of the explanation is
that these countries are relatively poor, Haiti in particular. But it could also be
that migrants from these countries are more likely to send remittances to their
families.
Table 4.8 presents the percentage change in GDP per capita and its com-
ponents, going from the zero remittances steady state to the benchmark. On
average, GDP per capita increases by 3%, consumption per capita by 7.9% and
investment per capita increases by 11.5%.
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Figure 4.3 shows the increase in GDP per capita plotted against the remittances-
to-GDP ratio. There is significant variation in the increase in GDP per capita
across countries, depending on the level of remittance transfers, as well as dif-
ferences in productivity, tradable sector share, investment-to-GDP and debt-
to-GDP ratios. Figure 4.4 shows how there is less variation in consumption
per capita, relative to GDP per capita. Generally, consumption and investment
per capita increase as the households have higher per capita income from the
remittance transfers.
Finally, the last two columns in table 4.8 show that on average, exports per
capita decrease, and imports per capita increase. This is also consistent with
Dutch Disease predictions. For the benchmark steady state equilibrium, in the
Balance of Payment Identity, remittance inflows are offset by trade balance
deficits. Whereas, in the zero migration, zero remittances steady state, each
country is running a trade surplus to cover the interest payments on the na-
tional debt. Holding the debt and interest payments constant, this means that
exports must fall relative to imports.
4.4.3 Increasing Non-Tradable Productivity
The results in the previous section suggest that remittance transfers benefit
recipient countries in terms of higher GDP and consumption per capita. In
this section, I quantify the benefits from increasing the non-tradable sector
productivity in remittance receiving countries.
Obviously, increasing the productivity in any sector will increase output
125



































0 .05 .1 .15 .2
GDP pc Fitted values




































0 .05 .1 .15 .2
C pc Fitted values
126
and likely consumption. In this experiment, I would like to isolate the benefits
from remittance inflows. To achieve this I recalibrate the model and repeat the
experiment from the previous section for all countries where the non-tradable
sector productivity is less than the tradable sector productivity. That is, when
ANT < AT , I increase ANT , until ANT = AT . I hold constant the level of mi-
gration, the remittance share of GDP, and the debt-to-GDP ratio, so that they
exactly match the Benchmark calibration levels. Next, I compare this new
steady state equilibrium to the zero migration, zero remittances steady state,
keeping ANT = AT .
Tables 4.9 and 4.10 present the results for GDP and consumption per capita,
respectively. In table 4.9, the first column shows the percentage increase in
GDP per capita comparing the Benchmark to the zero remittances steady state
(the results from the previous section), and the second column shows the re-
sults from the same experiment when the model is recalibrated such that
ANT = AT . As a reference, the third column shows the Benchmark non-tradable
sector productivity.
The important observation here is that the increase in GDP and consump-
tion per capita from remittance inflows is greater when the productivity in the
non-tradable sector matches that of the tradable sector. The averages suggest
that increasing the non-tradable sector productivity could increase the bene-
fits from remittance inflows by 33% in terms of higher GDP per capita, 27% in
terms of higher consumption per capita.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 plot the relative increase in GDP and consumption per
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Table 4.9: Counterfactual: Increasing Non-Tradable Sector Productivity
GDPpc GDPpc Benchmark
Country Benchmark ANT = AT ANT /AT
Antigua & Barbuda 4.5 5.1 0.88
Aruba 0.3 0.3 0.94
Barbados 4.3 5.3 0.68
Belize 9.4 10.7 0.75
Bolivia 0.2 0.3 0.57
Brazil 0.1 0.1 0.72
Colombia 0.5 0.5 0.91
Costa Rica 0.8 0.8 0.92
Cuba 1.9 2.3 0.73
Dominica 5.3 6.4 0.64
Ecuador 1.0 1.0 0.93
El Salvador 3.1 3.2 0.88
Grenada 13.8 17.5 0.63
Guatemala 0.8 0.9 0.52
Haiti 2.8 3.0 0.94
Honduras 1.7 1.9 0.57
Jamaica 8.5 9.1 0.78
Mexico 1.6 2.0 0.59
Nicaragua 3.5 3.5 0.63
Panama 1.3 1.9 0.52
St. Kitts & Nevis 1.5 11.8 0.37
St. Lucia 5.0 8.2 0.53
St. Vincent 6.8 8.4 0.63
Average 3.3 4.4 0.71
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Table 4.10: Counterfactual: Increasing Non-Tradable Sector Productivity
Cpc Cpc Benchmark
Country Benchmark ANT = AT ANT /AT
Antigua & Barbuda 6.3 7.2 0.88
Aruba 0.8 0.8 0.94
Barbados 9.1 11.4 0.68
Belize 11.8 15.8 0.75
Bolivia 2.1 2.2 0.57
Brazil 0.4 0.5 0.72
Colombia 2.5 2.5 0.91
Costa Rica 2.1 2.1 0.92
Cuba 5.1 5.9 0.73
Dominica 11.4 14.4 0.64
Ecuador 12.0 12.1 0.93
El Salvador 21.4 21.9 0.88
Grenada 20.0 32.8 0.63
Guatemala 4.6 5.1 0.52
Haiti 23.1 23.5 0.94
Honduras 10.6 11.6 0.57
Jamaica 23.0 25.5 0.78
Mexico 3.1 4.3 0.59
Nicaragua 15.1 16.4 0.63
Panama 1.2 2.4 0.52
St. Kitts & Nevis 8.4 27.3 0.37
St. Lucia 7.0 13.5 0.53
St. Vincent 12.9 17.2 0.63
Average 9.1 11.7 0.71
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capita against the non-tradable productivity levels in the Benchmark calibra-
tion.8 Both figures show that the potential increase in benefits from remit-
tance transfers are larger for countries with relatively low non-tradable sector
productivity. St. Lucia (LCA) and Panama (PAN) could potentially increase
the benefits from remittance inflows by about 50% in terms of higher GDP
per capita, and about double the benefits in terms of higher consumption per
capita.
4.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis: ψ
In the benchmark calibration ψ is set to exactly match the share of remittances
in GDP for each country.
Figure 4.7 shows a plot of remittance inflows over GDP compared to the
data when ψ = 1. As in the corresponding migration plot in figure 4.1, a perfect
fit would have the points line up exactly on the 45◦ line. When ψ = 1 the discrep-
ancy between the model and data appears larger than for migration, because
the model is now only calibrated to match the migration stocks, but not the
remittance inflows. Outliers to the left have remittance inflows that are over-
predicted by the model. Guyana, Belize, Dominica, Trinidad and Tobago are all
island economies which have high migration stocks relative to their domestic
population, yet the number of people sending remittances, or the average size
of remittances sent back to these countries is smaller than for the rest of the
sample. Alternatively, it could be that remittances sent to these countries for
some reason follow more informal channels, and therefore not recorded in the
8St. Kitts & Nevis is an outlier and does not appear in the plot.
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data.








































It is also important to mention that the remittance data shown in Figure
4.7 are total remittance inflows, whereas the migration data used in the cali-
bration only takes into account migrants in the U.S. that responded to the U.S.
census. It is likely that some temporary migrants send remittances back to
their home countries, but were not included in the U.S. census. The migration
data is also missing information on migrants to other countries. According to
Ratha and Shaw (2007), significant migration takes place between developing
economies, and estimates of south-south remittances range from 10 to 29 per-
cent of developing economies’ total remittances. With this information in mind,
it may be the case that the model overstates the remittance inflows for some
economies, and that some of the points to the right of the 45◦ line in Figure
4.7 actually shows an accurate representation of the remittances coming from
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permanent residents in the United States.
4.5 Conclusion
Remittance payments to Latin America and the Caribbean are an important
source of income for households in the region. For some countries, aggregate re-
mittance transfers exceed international aid and foreign direct investment, and
a growing literature has set out to investigate the potential impacts from such
large capital inflows. This paper examines the impact of remittance transfers
on the sectoral factor allocation and the accompanying welfare implications for
Latin American and Caribbean Economies.
The paper develops a quantitative model where remittance transfers are a
function of an endogenous migration decision. It is important to capture the
intimate relationship between migration and remittances in order to properly
account for the impact of remittance transfers on the sectoral factor allocation.
My results suggest that remittance inflows have increased the non-tradable
sector share by 6% on average, and by 15-20% for high remittance countries.
This supports the finding by for example Lartey, Mandelman, and Acosta that
remittance transfers generate a Dutch Disease effect.
My results further suggest that Latin American and the Caribbean economies
have experienced an increase in consumption per capita, on average 9.1%, as a
result of remittance transfers; however, the benefit is mitigated by the shift of
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productive resources into the less productive non-tradable sector. The quanti-
tative experiments suggest that the benefits from remittance transfers could be
27% higher in terms of increased consumption per capita, if the non-tradable
sector productivity increased to the tradable sector level. This is a novel find-
ing in the development and remittance transfer literature which has important
policy implications for economies receiving large remittance inflows.
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My thesis consists of three chapters investigating topics in international and
environmental economics. Although the topics are different, they are all exam-
ined within the context of quantitative open economy models.
Chapter 2 examined the role of production sharing and trade in the trans-
mission of the 2008-2009 recession. The results of this chapter suggest that the
recession had a large impact on GDP and trade in North America, where trade
linkages played a significant role in the transmission of the US recession to its
regional trading partners. In the benchmark calibration the model predictions
can account for 72% of the fall in output for Canada, 19% for Mexico, and al-
most two-thirds of the fall in trade. The quantitative experiments suggest that
production sharing accounts for about 40% of the fall in trade, but only 12% of
the fall in output. Together these results indicate that production sharing may
be an important factor in explaining why trade fell so much relative to output
during the great recession, and in explaining trade comovement in general.
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Chapter 3 quantified the net economic impact of climate change and climate
change policy on the Canadian economy. We find that while a carbon tax that
holds the stock of global emissions below the 550 ppm level would yield positive
net benefits for the world economy, the impact of such a tax on the Canadian
economy would be negative. This result is largely driven by our finding that
the damages from small increases in temperature are much smaller in Canada
than in the rest of the world.
In addition, our benchmark simulation results highlight the large impacts
that carbon taxes can have on long run shifts in fossil fuel prices by shifting
the temporal path of consumption.
The final essay in Chapter 4 examined the impact of remittance transfers
on the allocation of productive factors across sectors in Latin American and
Caribbean economies. The results suggest that countries in the region have
experienced an increase in consumption per capita by 9.1% on average as a
result of remittance transfers.
My results further suggest that the benefits from remittance transfers could
be 33% higher in terms of increased GDP per capita, and 27% in terms of
increased consumption per capita, if the non-tradable sector productivity in-
creased to the tradable sector level. The benefit is mitigated by the shift of pro-
ductive resources into the less productive non-tradable sector. The remittance
transfers generate a Dutch Disease effect where the non-tradable sector share
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Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) estimate the catastrophic impact from climate
change based on survey responses from experts in the scientific community.
Survey respondents were asked about the likelihood of low-probability, ”high
consequence” events resulting from climate change. (Here, ”high consequence”
means a 25 percent loss in global income indefinitely). They find that:
• For the US, the Willingness to Pay (WTP) to avoid catastrophic risk of
climate change is 0.45% of GDP at T = 2.5◦ of warming, and 2.53% at
T = 6◦ of warming.
• For the world, the WTP to avoid catastrophic risk of climate change is
about 1% of GDP at T = 2.5◦ of warming, and 7% at T = 6◦ of warming
(depending on use of output or population weights)
Using the estimates for the U.S. catastrophic impact I re-estimate our Cana-
dian damage function. In figure B.1, the new damage function is displayed
together with our old (Benchmark) damage function and the global damage
function from Nordhaus (2008).
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Interestingly, Mendelsohn’s estimates of market damages seem negligible
compared to potential catastrophic damages suggested by Nordhaus and Boyer
(2000).
B.2 Precipitation Sensitivity Analysis
Mendelsohn (2001) reports regional climate damages for five sectors (Agricul-
ture, Forestry, Energy, Coastal Structures, and Water Resources) at varying
degrees of warming (1.5, 2.5, and 5.0 degrees Celsius) and varying levels of
precipitation (0%, 7%, and 15% over 1990 levels) in 2060.
Our damage function was constructed using the damage estimates at 2.5
and 5.0 degrees of warming and 0% increase in precipitation for the four north-
ern U.S. regions. Figure B.2 shows the calibrated damage functions for 7%
and 15% increase in precipitation from Mendelsohn’s scenario analysis. At 7%
and 15% increase in precipitation, almost all of the regions experience either
higher benefits (or lower damages), and consequently, the damage functions for
these scenarios fall below the benchmark calibration. See pages 193 and 203
143




















0 2 4 6
0% Prec. 7% Prec.
15% Prec.
in Mendelsohn (2001) for details.
B.3 NRTEE Forestry Damage Estimates
In a recent report published by the National Roundtable on the Environment
and the Economy (NRTEE, 2011), regional damages to the forestry sector are
estimated based on impacts of climate change on fires, forest productivity, and
pests such as the pine beetle. Table B.1 shows the estimated damages.
The estimates were drawn primarily from research conducted by the Cana-
dian Forest Service at Natural Resources Canada. Damage estimates from
forest fires are based on forecasts of forest ares burned in different regions due
to climate change. Damage estimates from forest productivity and pests are
based on qualitative assessments stemming from judgments based on existing
literature.
Overall, damages of $2 - 17 billion for Canada in 2050 are high compared to
Mendelsohn’s estimated benefits to the forestry sector in the Northern United
States.
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Table B.1: NRTEE Forestry Damages
Low Climate Change High Climate Change
Region Slow Growth Rapid Growth
B.C. -0.5B 0.18% -3.1B 0.44%
Alberta -0.2B 0.06% -1.0B 0.14%
Prairies -0.5B 0.33% -3.3B 0.85%
Ontario -1.0B 0.11% -7.4B 0.31%
Quebec -0.3B 0.08% -2.1B 0.23%
Atlantic -0.1B 0.07% -0.5B 0.21%
Canada -2.4B 0.12% -17.4B 0.33%
Notes: $ 2008
Source: Table 4, Paying the Price, page 53, (NRTEE, 2011).
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There is no government in the model, and GDP can therefore be expressed as:
GDPt = Ct + It +NXt (C.1)
= pT,t(cT,t + iT,t) + pN,t(cN,t + iN,t) + qtxEX,t − q∗t xIM,t (C.2)
= pT,tyT,t + pN,tyN,t + qtxEX,t − q∗t xIM,t (C.3)
= pT,tyT,t + pN,tyN,t + qtxt − qtxH,t − q∗t xIM,t (C.4)
= pT,tyT,t + pN,tyN,t + qtxt − pT,tyT,t (C.5)








The first step, from (C.1) to (C.2), follows from the definitions of tradable
and non-tradable consumption and investment, exports and imports. Next,
from (C.2) to (C.3), follows from the resource constraints cT,t + iT,t = yT,t and
cN,t + iN,t = yN,t. Then, the step from (C.3) to (C.4) follows from the resource
constraint for the domestic intermediate good xt, where xt = xH,t + xEX,t. Fi-
nally, the step from (C.3) to (C.4) uses the zero profit condition for the tradable
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composite good, where pT,tyT,t = qtxH,t + q∗t xIM,t.
The Balance of Payment Identity, (C.8), can be stated as (C.9). Then, (C.2),
(C.7), and (C.9) implies the household’s period t budget constraint, (C.10). pT,t
is normalized to 1.
dt+1 +NXt + q
∗
tR(mt) = (1 + r
d
t )dt (C.8)
qtxEX,t − q∗t xIM,t = (1 + rdt )dt − dt+1 − q∗tR(mt) (C.9)
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